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With Directive 2014/95/EU on non-financial reporting, for the first time, certain 
large entities are obliged to disclose more than just financial data on their perfor-
mance. This in itself is a step forward as it underlines the importance of ecolog-
ical, social, governance and diversity policies for businesses and their impact on 
society. 
However, taking a closer look at the content and scope of the Directive as well as 
its transposition into member state law exposes a number of shortcomings. The 
Directive has largely failed to fulfil the initial expectations and hopes of trade un-
ions and civil society organisations. 
Transparency as such is not a value. It will not bring any improvements unless the 
disclosed information can be put into context. This is only possible if the informa-
tion is comprehensive, accurate and comparable. In particular, the lack of uniform 
reporting standards is bound to limit the quality of the information.
The long-term impact of the Directive on labour relations thus depends on two 
aspects, which are how legislation will further develop non-financial reporting and 
how trade unions and workers’ representatives are involved in the reporting and 
process the information presented by companies. The review of the Directive can 
be the next important stage on a path towards better corporate accountability and 
real sustainability. 
At any rate, trade unions and workers’ representatives will have to start dealing 
with non-financial reports. They can potentially play a crucial role in verifying the 
accuracy of the information provided by companies. To make this possible, we 
have to build capacities.
We hope that this publication will facilitate a discussion on the future of non-finan-
cial reporting from the perspective of trade unions and workers’ representatives.
Montserrat Mir Roca




DIRECTIVE 2014/95/EU – 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON 
LABOUR RELATIONS
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Directive 2014/95/EU (hereinafter: ‘the Direc-
tive’) for the first time makes disclosure of 
non-financial and diversity information oblig-
atory. Entering into force on 22 October 2014, 
the process of transposition into national 
law of the EU member states followed, which 
was required to be concluded by 6 December 
2016. 
See page 10 for a summary  
of Directive 2014/95/EU.
Starting from the fiscal year 2017, certain 
large undertakings within the EU will have 
to publish non-financial statements. These 
non-financial statements include employment 
and social matters and are thus expected to 
have an impact on labour relations. As a re-
sult, the Directive has sparked a controversial 
discussion within trade unions on national 
and European level. Standpoints range from 
complete rejection in fear of deterioration to 
great acceptance in expectance of improve-
ments. 
“DIMASOLAB” PROJECT
The project “DimasoLab” has set out to im-
prove the knowledge of the effects of the Di-
rective relevant for trade unions and workers’ 
representatives. With the insights, we hope 
to contribute to a critical and constructive 
debate on the role of trade unions and work-
ers’ representatives in non-financial reporting 
(NFIR). 
For this purpose, a network of European 
experts compiled 12 country reports. The 
reports provided information on the country 
specific labour relation systems, disclosure of 
non-financial information before the Directive 
and the transposition process of the Direc-
tive into national law. Experts from Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain compiled 
five longer country reports. Along with these, 
experts from Austria, Denmark, Great Britain, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland and Swe-
den conducted seven shorter country reports. 
As for the longer country studies, the re-
search was based on detailed questionnaires. 
Data was collected by means of desk re-
search combined with structured interviews 
with stakeholders from unions, company level 
employee representatives and employer rep-
resentatives, in which they laid out their  
perceptions and attitudes towards NFIR. 
By contrast, the research component involv-
ing the shorter country reports followed  
fewer, more general questions, mainly  
drawing upon desk research.
During the work phase of the “DimasoLab” 
Project, two conferences provided a platform 
for exchange between the involved experts 
and spotlight country specificities. 
Download  
the full-length country reports at  
www.aulnrw.de/DimasoLab
All country reports have been condensed into 
a synthesis report, which provides the knowl-
edge base of this report. The findings of one 
of the longer country reports serve as a start-
ing point in each chapter. Reflecting on these 
examples, we discuss the variations found in 
all other country reports.
Drawing on the synthesis report, the most 
relevant factors determining the impact of 
the Directive on labour relations were iden-
tified. These provided the basis to develop 
four scenarios. The scenarios precipitate the 
diversity of the country specific aspects into 
future-oriented perspectives, taking into ac-
count certainties and uncertainties that may 
result in fundamental alternatives. They thus 
leave enough room to picture different paths, 
while addressing the key determinants for fu-
ture developments. This is especially impor-
tant since there is no one-fits-all approach. 
The scenarios serve to foster the understand-
ing of interdependencies and their possible 
impacts on labour relations and to provide 
a starting point for dialogue at national and 
European level. 
In addition to the synthesis report and the 
scenarios, this final report includes short in-
terviews with some of the experts who carried 
out the research. The interviews provide room 
for personal assessments and opinions in 
clear demarcation to the other content. This 
way, we want to enrich the perspective on the 
past, present and future of NFIR with personal 
experience and national specificities.
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DIRECTIVE 2014/95/EU
On 22 October 2014, Directive 2014/95/EU1  was adopted, amending Directive 2013/34/EU re-
garding the disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings 
and groups. It aims to improve transparency of social and environmental information in order 
to identify sustainability risks and increase investor and consumer trust.
The Directive should help the measuring, monitoring and managing of undertakings’ per-
formance and their impact on society. The objective of the Directive is therefore to increase 
the relevance, consistency and comparability of the information disclosed by certain large 
undertakings and groups across the EU. This is sought to be achieved by establishing a cer-
tain minimum legal requirement as regards the extent of the information that should be made 
available to the public and authorities. The undertakings who are subject to this Directive must 
give a fair and comprehensive view of their policies, outcomes, and risks.
In the following, we provide a summary of the key elements to be found in Directive 2014/95/
EU. This is to aid a better understanding of its intended outcome, the overall context and all 




The obligation to disclose a non-financial 
statement only applies to those large under-
takings which are public-interest entities and 
to those public-interest entities which are 
parent undertakings of a large group.
Large undertakings
»»  Average number of employees  
in excess of 500  
plus
»»  Balance sheet total exceeding  
EUR 20 million 
or
»» Net turnover exceeding EUR 40 million.
Public-interest entities  
»» Credit institutions,
»» Insurance undertakings,
»»  Undertakings whose transferable securities 
are traded on the regulated market in at least 
one of the member states.
Additional definitions can be 
applied by member states  
»»  The member states should ensure  
that adequate and effective means  
exist to guarantee disclosure of  
non-financial information by undertakings  
in compliance with the Directive
Where undertakings are required to prepare 
a non-financial statement, that statement 
should contain information regarding
Environmental matters in  
terms of current and foreseeable 
impacts of the undertaking‘s 
operations, including
»» Health and safety,
»»  Use of renewable and/or  
non-renewable energy, 
»» Greenhouse gas emissions,
»» Water use, 
»» Air pollution.
 
Social and employee-related 
matters, including 
»»  Gender equality,
»»  Implementation of fundamental conventions 
of the International Labour Organisation,
»»  Working conditions,
»»  Social dialogue,
»»  Right of workers to be informed and 
consulted, Trade union rights, 
»»  Health and safety at work,
»»  Dialogue with local communities, and/or the 
actions taken to ensure the protection and 




Information for each of the above-
mentioned fields must contain
»» Business models,
»» Policies pursued,
»» Outcomes of the policies,
»» Risk related to those matters,
»»  Non-financial key performance  
indicator relevant to the business.
MATERIALITY
The undertakings should provide adequate 
information in relation to matters that, in their 
assessment, might be the most likely trig-
gers of principle risks with potentially severe 
impacts, along with those risks that have al-
ready materialised
SAFE HARBOUR
Information relating to impending develop-
ments or matters still subject to negotiation 
may be omitted in exceptional cases where 
the disclosure of such information would se-
riously compromise the commercial position 
of the undertaking. It has to be ensured that 
such an omission does not prevent a fair and 
balanced understanding of the development, 
performance and position of the undertaking, 
as well as the impact of its activity.
FRAMEWORKS
Non-financial statements may rely on national 
frameworks as well as those recognised in 
the EU or internationally. These include
»»  Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
(EMAS),
»»  United Nations (UN) Global Compact  
Guiding Principles,
»»  OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises,
»»  ISO 26000,
»»  ILO Tripartite Declaration,
»»  Global Reporting Initiative.
‘COMPLY  
OR EXPLAIN’
If policies are not yet applied, there should 
not be any obligation to put one in place. 
However, the consolidated non-financial 
statement has to include a clear explanation 
as to why this is the case. 
DISCLOSURE
The non-financial statement may be disclosed 
either as part of the management report or a 
separate report. In case a separate report is 
published, this has to be done alongside the 
management report or within 6 months of the 
balance sheet date. 
AUDITS
The objective of the audit is to ensure that 
non-financial statements have been prepared. 
Beyond that, certain member states may also 
require for their content to be checked.
NON-
COMPLIANCE
Sanctions or fines in case of non-compliance 




The impact of NFIR on labour relations will strongly depend on the practical value of those 
reports as perceived by trade unions and workers’ representatives. Only if it is potentially high 
enough, will efforts towards their utilisation be undertaken.
Another aspect determining possible impact of NFIR on labour relations are the potential con-
tact points for trade unions and workers’ representatives in NFIR. These will define whether 
they will want and/or have to assume an active or passive role in NFIR.
The following summary will give an overview of the key factors determining the practical value 
of NFIR for trade unions and workers’ representatives as well as the potential contact points. 
These determining key factors have been identified through the synthesis of the country re-
ports and are presented in reference to selected examples from individual countries.
SCOPE
Horizontal
The horizontal dimension of the scope is determined by the criteria according to which compa-
nies fall under the member state laws. Most member states have transposed the Directive in a 
one-to-one manner concerning the thresholds for the number of employees, balance sheet and 
turnover as well as the definitions of public interest entities (PIEs). 
Denmark and Sweden are the only countries that have lowered the threshold for the average 
number of employees in their transposition of the Directive. Both apply a minimum of 250 in-
stead of 500 employees, while keeping the thresholds for balance sheet and turnover close to 
those set out in the Directive. This is due to a somewhat different categorisation of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME) in these countries.
Sweden has introduced an additional clause obliging companies to publish NFIR regardless of 
whether they fall within the PIEs definition, as long as they fulfil the two other criteria.
Denmark also sees some state-owned limited liability companies as PIEs.
In France, PIEs include non-listed sociétés anonymes and non-listed investment funds with net 
turnover above EUR 100 million.
Lithuania has included large state and/or municipality-owned public or private limited liability 
companies in their list of PIEs.
The most controversial point in the discussions accompanying the transposition regarding the 
horizontal scope has been the definition of PIEs.
One demand has been to include at least state-owned companies with a commercial, financial 
or economic task because they have to fulfil an exemplary role. Beyond that, it has been argued 
that state-owned companies should generally be considered public interest. 
A major point of criticism is the strong focus on listed companies, as this does not determine 
their relevance for society but only for stock markets. By way of example, in Germany, this will 
exclude the four largest food retailers each with a turnover of between 57 and EUR 30 billion in 
2018.
In Denmark and Sweden, lowering the threshold to 250 employees will also most likely not lead 
to any significant increase in the overall number of companies that have to report, as the previ-
ously existing laws already covered more companies.
In France, the transposition of the Directive might even have an adverse effect because of the 
limited scope of the new law in comparison with the previously existing legal obligations.
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The currently used horizontal scope of application significantly limits the number of compa-
nies that are obliged to report. In addition, the companies which fall within this scope of appli-
cation are very likely to be those which were already publishing more information in the past.
Vertical 
The reach of NFIR within the structures of corporations defines the vertical dimension of the 
scope. This can be through inclusion of subsidiaries and supply chains or formal involvement 
of stakeholders.
In none of the member states do subsidiaries have to report separately, instead, they can al-
ways be included in a consolidated statement. While this intends to limit the administrative 
burden placed on companies, what it also does is that it disconnects NFIR from the business 
and workplace level. 
Supply chains were also not integrated in NFIR by any member state. In many cases today, in-
formation about the working conditions in supply chains, for example, in developing countries, 
is rare and can often only be obtained through NGOs or local activists. With further advancing 
globalisation, any information on this will gain importance for leveraging influence by trade 
unions and workers’ representatives in the home countries of companies. Integrating supply 
chains, therefore, could have a particularly high practical value for trade unions and workers’ 
representatives, generating new information.
The Directive did not explicitly mention any internal stakeholders and, as a result, it was little 
surprise that this was also not topical in member state transpositions.
One example for the vertical integration of NFIR, albeit not immediately resulting from the Di-
rective, is the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance. Still, it must be seen in the con-
text of NFIR as it can be considered ‘part of a package’ negotiated within the framework of the 
transposition process.
Coming into effect in 2017, the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance established a 
legally binding obligation for parent companies to identify and prevent adverse impacts on 
human rights and the environment. Such impacts can result from their own activities, from the 
activities of the companies they control, or from the activities of the subcontractors and sup-
pliers with whom they have an established commercial relationship. 
In their annual vigilance plans, which must be publicly available, the companies covered by the 
law have to assess and address the risks of serious harm to people and the planet.
Even though the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance may, in fact, be seen as not 
necessarily a component of NFIR, it is very likely that the companies who will now have to pre-
pare and implement a vigilance plan will incorporate it into their NFIR. Introducing the vigilance 
plan in a separate law, on the other hand, has provided the possibility to apply it with a different 
scope than that of NFIR.
DISCLOSURE
According to the Directive, the NFIR can be published as part of the annual management report 
or as a separate document. Almost all member states have left it up to the entities to choose 
the format of the disclosure. Only the United Kingdom and France deviated from that. 
In the United Kingdom, companies have to publish the statement as part of their strategic re-
ports. The strategic report has to be audited for compliance with the legal requirements and 
any material misstatements. The audit report must state whether the information in the stra-
tegic reports is consistent with that in the annual accounts and compliant with the applicable 
legal requirements.
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In France, the NFIR has to be published as part of the annual management report. This is not 
relevant for auditing as there is no automatism. However, what is noteworthy is that trade un-
ions at company level in France have the right to write a statement on the annual management 
report, which has to be published alongside it. This means that trade unions in the future will 
have the possibility to give an official comment on the NFIR as well. In both cases, the format 
of the disclosure has direct implications for the verification of its content.
The publication of NFIR as part of the annual management report must not be confused with 
the practice of integrated reporting though. Integrated reporting implies that financial and 
non-financial information is published in such a way that the relationship between the two is 
made clear. Integrated reporting, though it was given a positive connotation in the Directive, 
was not topical in its transposition.
However, in Belgium, it is stated that the NFIR has to be “in accordance with” the information 
contained in the annual management report. Whether or not this will have an impact on the 
format of the disclosure or the use of certain reporting standards has yet to be seen. 
Another important aspect regarding the disclosure is the availability in terms of the publica-
tion, distribution and collection of NFIR.
In several member states, the NFIR has to be published on the company website, with one 
example being Lithuania. In some countries, a period of time has been specified for which the 
report has to be kept available there. This is the case in, for instance, Denmark and Germany, 
with requirements for availability of 5 and 10 years, respectively. In the case of Germany, how-
ever, the period only applies if the website is referenced in the annual management report as 
containing the NFIR report.
In other countries, the only specification is where these reports have to be submitted for col-
lection, namely the same register as is the case with the annual management reports. The 
availability, thus, depends on the publication practices of the national register. In Italy, to ac-
cess the annual management reports, one has to purchase them, and this will most likely be 
the case with NFIR as well. This could drastically limit the availability to the broader public. 
Based on the experience so far, it can be assumed that many companies will volunteer to pub-
lish their reports online.
CONTENT
Materiality
The materiality analysis determines which items are considered important enough to be part 
of a company’s NFIR. There are two components to this: the process and the subjects. Usually, 
materiality is determined by matching the company perspective with the results from stake-
holder dialogue. How this stakeholder dialogue is organised varies between companies. At 
present, active involvement of trade unions and workers’ representatives appears to be rather 
sporadic. It would be a logical first step towards real involvement in NFIR to make it obligatory 
for elected workers’ representatives and trade unions which are partners to the collective bar-
gaining agreements entered into by the company to be actively involved.
Looking at the subject of the materiality analysis, labour relations are usually listed as one of 
the points. Even in cases where they are not considered important enough to be part of NFIR, 
it has to be clear that in companies where employees have elected representatives, labour re-
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lations have to be mentioned in all NFIR matters involving employees. Some examples of this 
can be found in Germany, though it has yet to be made a standard in all companies and other 
countries. Any other practice would have to be equated with effectively not recognising the 
right for employee interests to be represented.
‘Comply or Explain’
The ‘comply or explain’ option has been adopted by all member states. This principle illustrates 
that NFIR is solely about disclosure, and not as much about changing the behaviour of compa-
nies. A change in behaviour could only be achieved via indirect mechanisms like pressure from 
markets or stakeholders. 
Safe harbour
With the exception of Denmark, all member states have included the safe harbour clause in the 
transposition.
Trade unions and workers’ representatives are critical of the safe harbour clause because its 
formulation leaves room for interpretation. It is feared that the safe harbour clause will be mis-
applied in order to avoid the disclosure of unfavourable information.
Guidelines
As stated in the Directive, the European Commission has released guidelines to help compa-
nies disclose environmental and social information1 . These guidelines are not mandatory and 
companies may decide to use international, European or national guidelines according to their 
own characteristics or business environment. Due to the non-binding and exemplary character 
of the guidelines, they appear to be more of a glossary on NFIR than an element for guidance. 
It is unlikely that they will play an actual role for NFIR in near future. However, parts of these 
guidelines could serve as a blueprint for amending the Directive later on. Therefore, they can-
not be ignored when considering the future of NFIR and its impact on labour relations.  
The absence of binding guidelines originating from trade unions and workers’ representatives 
raises the question of how analyses of NFIR can be designed and organised. For an analysis 
to be meaningful, it would be important to provide some sort of solid frame of reference that 
is concrete enough to provide orientation but not too complicated to be applied in practice. All 
the more regrettable is the fact that all examined member states have thus far refrained from 
stipulating specific standards. 
Reporting Standards
Reporting standards have been gaining importance in the last years and, with obligatory NFIR 
and its blurry non-binding guidelines, this trend is very likely to continue. Regardless of the ac-
tual ‘value added’ seen in NFIR, trade unions and workers’ representatives will need to develop 
a basic understanding of reporting standards. 
Reporting standards can be roughly divided into item-specific and referential standards. 
Item-specific standards, such as ISO 14001 and the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
(EMAS), follow a rather strict certification logic. By comparison, referential standards, like the 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines by the Global Reporting Initiative (hereafter GRI) and ISO 
26 000, are more general and serve to give orientation and guidance instead of directing one 
along a predefined routine. It is also possible to differentiate between the various referential 
frameworks according to how they are subsequently elaborated. The ISO standards, for exam-
ple, follow a periodical review every five years and, based on the outcome, a revision process 
1 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017XC0705(01)
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can be initiated. The development of the GRI standards, on the other hand, takes place on an 
ongoing basis. This is due to the nature of the organisations behind these standards. Both 
follow a multi-stakeholder approach but ISO develops a large number of standards for very 
different purposes, while GRI is dedicated to just the one topic and its continuous further de-
velopment. For labour relations, what is important is that trade unions are recognised as stake-
holders by both ISO and GRI.
In the transposition processes, an open formulation regarding reporting standards has been 
widely adopted. Usually, no framework is explicitly mentioned and it is only stated that ‘recog-
nised’ frameworks can be applied. 
Again, the only exception is Denmark, where the United Nations Global Compact Communica-
tion on Progress (COP), Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) and Global Reporting Ini-
tiative (GRI) are explicitly set out as frameworks that can be applied. Even though this does not 
exclude any other ‘recognised’ frameworks, it reflects the acceptance of the ones listed and 
could effectively promote their use.
Reporting standards bring into play third parties that influence NFIR and its effects on labour 
relations. Trade unions are thus well advised to continue and, maybe, intensify their participa-
tion in further developing reporting standards.
National standards have also been developed. In Germany, for example, an increasing number 
of companies are using the Deutscher Nachhaltigkeitskodex (transl. German Sustainability 
Code). It is aligned with the requirements of small and medium-sized enterprises in particular 
and can be tied to the UN Global Compact and GRI.
The introduction of obligatory NFIR is likely to fuel the development of new standards that are 
especially designed for particular national, segment or sectoral or issue specific requirements. 
Concerns have been raised that standards might also be developed with the aim to minimise 
disclosure. The phrasing ‘recognised’ could prove to become problematic because it is by no 
means specified by whom or how a framework has to be recognised.
With the increase in the number of different reporting standards, a systemic harmonisation 
would be desirable in order to attain more comparable, concise and consistent corporate re-
porting.
Complexity
The complexity of NFIR is determined by the way in which information is compiled and present-
ed in the reports. This, in turn, largely depends on who are considered the main addressees, as 
well as the reporting framework that the NFIR is oriented towards. So far, NFIR appears to be 
directed solely towards investors and rating agencies. Because those target groups are highly 
specialised in the analysis of company information, this often leads to abstract and complex 
NFIR. Mandatory reporting standards would allow trade unions and workers’ representatives to 
develop the necessary analytical skills. In the mid to long-term, the absence of mandatory re-
porting standards may pose a problem, especially for trade unions. This is because, over time, 
companies will develop a reporting culture, allowing workers’ representatives to develop and 
adjust analytical skills. Trade unions, on the other hand, will have to deal with the complexity 
of reporting in whole sectors, which can greatly differ between companies. This could possibly 
hinder the widespread acceptance and use of NFIR by trade unions. One extreme example for 




The quality of NFIR is influenced by many different factors which depend on the reporting or 
analysis standards that are applied. It is therefore hard to objectively measure the quality of 
NFIR as it will always depend on the design of the frame of reference. This implies that trade 
unions and workers’ representatives will have to develop their own standards for performing 
structured assessments of the quality of NFIR from their point of view. This becomes especial-
ly important when looking at the external drivers for the evolution of the quality of NFIR over 
time. 
On the one hand, audits and sanctions could lead to an improvement in the quality of NFIR. 
Concerns regarding the possibly ‘dubious quality’ of NFIR in the absence of audits have been 
raised by trade unions, for example in Belgium. On the other hand, trade unions and workers’ 
representatives in France are afraid that outsourcing the interpretative authority regarding the 
quality of NFIR to commercial auditors will have negative effects.
A second line of argumentation for the evolution of the quality of NFIR over time is competition 
as a market mechanism. Arguably, companies will compete for investments based on their 
NFIR ratings. Following on from this thought, it would be likely that expectations of trade un-
ions and workers’ representatives will not necessarily be met, as the ratings will almost solely 
take into account the perspective of the market participants from the capital side. Even if the 
quality of publications did improve through market mechanisms, one can assume that it would 
not automatically lead to higher quality information for trade unions and workers’ representa-
tives. Depending on the rating processes applied by the different agencies, the ratings could 
potentially be influenced by trade unions and workers’ representatives.
ACCOUNTABILITY
Auditing
The only requirement set out in the EU Directive is that external statutory auditors and audit 
firms should check whether the non-financial statement or the separate report has been pre-
pared. In addition, member states are free to require any verification processes that go beyond 
that. With only a few exceptions, almost all the countries have limited themselves to the mini-
mum requirement. 
A particularly noteworthy example with regard to auditing practices is Italy, where both an 
external and internal audit must be carried out and published alongside the non-financial infor-
mation statement. The results of the internal audit must also be reported to the shareholders’ 
meeting and included in the annual management report. Furthermore, the Italian legislation 
requires that the information in the non-financial information statement be consistent with the 
financial information in the annual management report. 
Another example where auditing requirements have been extended is the United Kingdom. 
Since companies in the United Kingdom have to publish the non-financial statement as part of 
their strategic reports, the information provided has to be audited for compliance with the legal 
requirements and any material misstatements. The audit report must state whether the infor-
mation in the strategic reports is consistent with that in the annual accounts and compliant 
with the applicable legal requirements.
Although external auditing requirements are limited to the minimum in Germany, interestingly, 
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the legislator has decided that internal audits fall within the remit of the company’s supervisory 
board. As supervisory boards of large listed companies are composed of equal representation 
of the employer’s representatives and workers’ representatives, workers’ representatives will 
inevitably be faced with NFIR in the future and will have to take a position on this matter.
Auditing requirements such as these increase the potential for NFIR to be compiled with grater 
diligence, which, in turn, could further increase their overall impact. However, in some cases, 
demands raised by unions were perceived not to be practicable even by the unions themselves. 
One documented example was the plea to include stricter rules for the auditor in Belgium, go-
ing beyond only a certificate on the release of the necessary information but, instead, including 
a verification of whether the given information is quantitatively and qualitatively correct and 
consistent with the annual account numbers. Otherwise, the trade unions anticipated reports 
on non-financial information of dubious quality. At the same time, trade unionists recognised 
that this might be difficult in practice. A similar obligation regarding the numbers on the social 
balance sheet already existed but auditors rarely checked these numbers because it was found 
to be too difficult. This will likely be the case with NFIR as well. 
This presents a general dilemma as the ‘administrative burden’ attributed to new regulations 
often results in criticism and objections. However, without any control mechanisms going be-
yond the mere publication, the substance of the reports could possibly be watered down to an 
extent which would undermine their overall purpose.
However, this is not the only argument against a general extension of auditing requirements. 
During the consultation process, French unions were very critical of the role of auditors and 
the importance of audits and analyses carried out by a third party. They argued that as long 
as companies were free to choose any auditor they favoured, this would only foster a growing 
market of auditors adjusting and selling their services to company needs. This way, the inter-
pretative authority would rest in the hands of contractors that depended on follow-up man-
dates by the companies they were auditing. Combined with a lack of binding guidelines, this 
could easily result in significantly biased analyses that would fail to take into consideration 
the employees’ perspective, which is further exacerbated by the fact that NFIR gives plenty of 
room for interpretation depending on the context and frame of the report. French unions there-
fore argued that only an “actual independent third party” could be entrusted with carrying out 
audits that would find official recognition. In this regard, in Spain, the idea of social audits was 
brought up by trade unions. In contrast to conventional auditing practices, social audits by an 
independent party could verify information on employment and social matters. This could also 
open up new fields of actions for trade unions. 
On the contrary, it can also be argued that external auditing is not necessary at all, as compe-
tition will emerge between companies through the publication of NFIR. Here, it is important to 
remember that the EU Directive is intended to increase transparency also for the growing seg-
ment of ‘ethical or sustainable finance’ and to be an additional source of information for risk 
management strategies by investors. Thus, the efforts and stringency applied by companies 
in putting together such reports could be positively influenced by competition for capital from 
those investors who take account of non-financial information in their market equations. Evi-
dence of this can be seen in the various CSR competitions that have been introduced in many 
countries and where the company participation rate is very high. Besides asserting the com-
pany’s leading position with regard to sustainable governance, winning an award for its NFIR 
could, in turn, have a positive effect on the social dialogue within the company.
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Sanctions
Another gateway to motivate engagement could be sanctions in case of non-compliance. They 
could be used to build up pressure in case of diverging opinions on the content and quality of 
NFIR. This in itself could have an impact on labour relations, which should not be underesti-
mated.
The majority of the countries have decided to specify fines in their respective National Ac-
counting Acts, Corporate Laws or Business Codes. There are only a few examples, where either 
no sanctions at all, or very specific sanctions and fines have been introduced. 
Despite explicit demands from trade unions, France has not included any sanctions or fines, 
though its regulations allow for any interested party to demand the disclosure of information 
through court proceedings. In other countries, sanctions for violations in NFIR are much more 
stringent and therefore more likely to have an impact. In the United Kingdom and Germany, 
failure to prepare and publish a NFIR according to the requirements is considered a criminal 
offence. In Germany, the duties of disclosing NFIR are actually ranked equal to financial report-
ing duties. The German law thus foresees imprisonment of up to three years or monetary fines 
in case of premeditated incorrect account or concealment of the company’s circumstances in 
NFIR. In addition, the provisions concerning fines have been extended to include NFIR as well. 
In particular, withholding information or giving inadequate information on environmental, em-
ployee, social, human rights or anti-corruption and anti-bribery matters can be subject to fines. 
What can also result in fines is the failure to state the reference framework used for reporting, 
if one was used. In Italy, fines of EUR 20.000 – 150.000 will be applied for omission of relevant 
information, non-compliance or failure to submit the report within the required timeframe.  
Even though no formal obligation for external auditing of the content of the NFIR has been 
included in the law, possible sanctions may result in the management taking more interest in 
voluntary external audits. If external examination is carried out, the law, in turn, requires the 
audit report to be published. This yields an idea of how new sources of information could be 
created indirectly.  
Rating agencies
Rating agencies are becoming increasingly important as they play a key role in the competition 
for investment through market mechanisms. Their interpretative authority in terms of quality 
perception must not be underestimated either. Many of them come from a clearly environmental 
background and it is not always evident if they give employment and social factors equal consid-
eration. The rating processes differ, but in many cases, there is at least the theoretical option to 
submit additional information. Handing in ‘social audits’ (see audits) carried out by trade unions 
and workers’ representatives could be a way to balance out these ratings towards equal inclusion 
of employment and social factors and it would provide room for clarification. It should therefore 
be a strategic option which trade unions in particular should be very mindful of.
The only country so far where trade unions are known to play an active role in NFIR rating is 
France. VIGEO is a rating agency that is not part of trade union structures but has been found-
ed by a former secretary general of the CFDT.
Also in France, a trade union label for sustainable investment has been developed from the 
cooperation of the largest trade union confederations, which is intended to direct investments 
from pension funds and employee savings plans towards sustainable financial products. Par-




Recognition of TU and WC 
What is worth mentioning is the fact that trade unions and workers’ representatives are usu-
ally mentioned as stakeholders in NFIR. However, they are seldom referred to on a substantial 
level, which is also a factor that can increase their indifference towards NFIR. The passive role 
is not necessarily chosen, as the management hardly ever involves workers’ representatives in 
NFIR. Even in countries and companies with well-established labour relation structures, a con-
sultation process on NFIR matters almost never takes place. In addition, only in a few cases, 
there are obligations to present NFIR to workers’ representatives, but even then, they are not 
always fulfilled.
All country studies have shown the same picture: there is formal recognition of trade unions 
and workers’ representatives as stakeholders but there is no actual involvement of them. Own-
ership of NFIR lies with the management, which has no intrinsic motivation to involve trade 
unions and workers’ representatives beyond the relationships that already exist. Striving to 
achieve not only formal but also actual recognition could therefore present a crucial entry point 
for trade unions and workers’ representatives into NFIR.
Another observation that can be made is that employer associations are frequently in fierce op-
position to NFIR in general, while the disapproval from the company side is not brought forward 
as strongly. One conclusion that could be drawn from this would be that employer associations 
will be less willing to recognise and involve trade unions as stakeholders in NFIR than man-
agement at company level. On the other hand these seemingly divergent positions of employer 
associations and management at company level could be owed to ‘division of labour’. While 
employer associations are not subject to market perceptions, companies might not want to be 
directly associated with negative statements regarding their reporting capabilities, fearing this 
could be interpreted as a lack of reporting competencies. 
Engagement
In order to pursue any strategy to actively engage in and further develop NFIR, trade unions 
and workers’ representatives will have to monitor and intervene in NFIR processes. Ideally, 
this would be realised by applying uniform evaluation standards for analysis across branches 
and countries in order to increase comparability. Besides a consensus on common evaluation 
standards, this would require capacity building in special skills of unionists and workers’ rep-
resentatives. What the French case of Legrand has shown is that various representatives from 
the European Works Council see an opportunity in NFIR to develop a common language and 
advance towards a greater uniformity of rights between the different countries of Europe. Only 
very few actual efforts in this direction are known so far.  
Multi-Stakeholder
In many countries, governments had already established CSR platforms, forums or obser-
vatories before the EU Directive. Usually, these are multi-stakeholder forums consisting of 
business leaders, employer body representatives, trade unions, environmental organisations, 
consumer bodies and researchers.
This has brought new actors to the table where there were previously only social partners. 
More precisely, completely new committees have been installed next to existing bodies. This 
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poses opportunities, but with rather vaguely defined competencies, it may also result in con-
flicts of interest and competing competencies. 
An example from Belgium shows that sometimes actors from civil society organisations can be 
outplayed by labour relation bodies. This was the case when the Federal Council for Sustainable 
Development Belgium (FRDO) was asked to hand in a second recommendation in addition to that 
of the Central Economic Council (CEC). The FRDO advises the Belgian federal government on 
federal policy regarding sustainable development. The members of the Council are representa-
tives of various social groups: environmental organisations, organisation for development coop-
eration, employee and employer bodies, youth organisations and the scientific world. The FRDO 
eventually did not express any advice because of a lack of consensus. This was partly caused 
by the position of the Association of Belgian Companies, the only inter-professional employers’ 
organisation that represents companies of the three Belgian regions. From the onset, they stated 
that they would be unable to achieve a consensus within the FRDO because their standpoints 
were too different from those of the NGOs and environmental organisations. This was part of a 
strategy to limit the implementation obligations to the bare minimum. By contrast, an agreement 
within the CEC, with only the social partners present, was more feasible. In this example, it be-
comes clear that double structures might well be utilised by single parties for strategic purposes. 
Until now, this seemed to have worked in favour of labour relation bodies, as it was preferred by 
employers’ associations to have bilateral instead of multilateral negotiations. At the same time, it 
is not clear if this will prove true in future, especially when it comes to environmental matters.
Coalition building
Either way, it becomes clear that unions will have to rethink and further define their stance 
towards other civil society groups and NGOs, and their cooperation structures. This is both 
because they may be competing for influence but also because they are running risk of being 
played out against organisations with an environmental focus. In any case, trade unions and 
NGOs can exercise more influence in the field of NFIR acting together rather than separately.
One consequence of a new approach to multi-stakeholder relations could thus be a greater 
need for more permanent coalition building with other actors. This could ultimately also drive 
the development of a social-ecological strategy for unions.
Trade unions and workers’ representatives have built coalitions with NGOs for different pur-
poses in the past. Usually, these coalitions were functional cooperations for a limited period of 
time. An example is the cooperation of French trade unions and NGOs for the introduction of an 
“ethics label” in the textile industry in 1995 and similar efforts since 2016 to introduce a label 
in the electronics sector. On the other hand, also in France, several specific initiatives between 
trade unions and NGOs have led to the establishment of formal and permanent institutions 
such as the CSR Platform and the Citizen Forum on CSR, promoting CSR policies and estab-
lishing long-term dialogue between different stakeholders at national level. 
PERCEPTION 
Attitudes help us define how we see situations and things as well as define how we behave 
towards that situation or thing.  Attitudes also provide us with internal cognitions or beliefs and 
thoughts. The perception of things is therefore largely influenced by attitudes, while attitudes, 
in turn, shape perception. Against this background, we assume that the attitudes of trade un-
ions and workers’ representatives towards the EU Directive and NFIR will certainly determine 
their impact on labour relations. We have therefore identified aspects that could influence the 
general attitude towards NFIR and the perception of it. 
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Classification
In some countries, the EU Directive did not receive much attention from unions and workers’ 
representatives as it was not perceived to be labour law. In Sweden for example, the legislative 
transposition process of the EU Directive was entirely void of conceptualisations of immediate 
worker interest in this matter. Instead, the discussion was solely geared towards actors such 
as investors, clients and consumers. Labour law, which is otherwise such a prominent phe-
nomenon in Sweden, was absent from the debate about companies’ disclosure of non-financial 
information. The legislator seems to have subscribed to a strict line of demarcation between 
classic labour law and corporate law/accounting law. The Swedish law and society thus per-
ceived the EU Directive as far removed from labour law and trade unions. 
By contrast, in Italy, non-financial reporting is looked at from an ethical point of view. Inter-
views have shown that NFIR is considered to be about integrating responsible behaviour into 
the company’s day-to-day operations and it should therefore be based on the principle of equal 
dignity of all subjects involved in these business activities. In order to achieve this, social and 
environmental sustainability has to become a fundamental parameter of business activity, 
while trade unions should act as a link between the company and the regional level in order to 
promote NFIR as an instrument of economic democracy. 
The country studies have shown that the classifications of NFIR vary widely. However, it can 
be assumed that the category that NFIR is perceived to fall into will influence the degree of 
involvement of workers’ representatives and, thus, its potential impact.  
Terminology 
It has also become evident that in many cases terminology and its connotations are perceived 
very differently. In many cases, there is a reference to Corporate Social Responsibility, a vague 
concept leaving plenty of room for interpretation. In other cases, there is an explicit link to 
sustainability, which is still predominantly associated with environmental matters by labour 
relation actors as well as politicians. 
One fact supporting this perception is the composition of the ‘High Level Expert Group on Sus-
tainable Finance in the context of the Capital Markets Union’ appointed by the European Com-
mission. It consists of players from the finance and insurance sectors, researchers and envi-
ronmental organisations (i.e. WWF), but no trade unions. ‘Sustainability’ in this context fails to 
include social dimensions. There are different ways to interpret this push. One could be that 
there is a tendency to highlight the environmental reference of sustainability due to emerging 
industries, especially in the energy sector, which are interesting for the finance and insurance 
industries. Another take could be that politicians recognise that, while labour relations are 
rather well organised and have both a long history and a high degree of institutionalisation, in 
many countries, the dialogue between industries and environmental organisations is often way 
behind. In either case, the use and interpretation of terminology can be a determinant of the 
perception and agenda setting regarding non-financial reporting.
Often, Corporate Social Responsibility and sustainability are used interchangeably, while the 
concept of NFIR has not yet gained any foothold at all. This can prove to be decisive, since in 
many cases, trade unions and worker’s representatives are rather critical of CRS, perceiving it 
as a marketing strategy. In order to influence labour relations positively, NFIR should be estab-
lished as a clear concept in itself and it is crucial that it has a positive connotation. 
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Relevance 
The efforts and involvement of trade unions and workers’ representatives in the transposition pro-
cess of the EU Directive were generally perceived to be rather restrained. It has become clear that, 
as of now, only very few trade unionists and workers’ representatives have any idea of the topic of 
NFIR. Moreover, the examples have shown that even in countries and companies where NFIR has 
been an established concept for many years, only in a few exceptional cases were workers’ repre-
sentatives involved in the consultation on or the preparation of non-financial reports.
In almost all the countries, NFIR was perceived as part of a company’s marketing and com-
munication strategy for meeting the expectations of the financial community and rating agen-
cies, rather than a true accountability tool. For trade unions and workers’ representatives the 
fact that they are not recognised as stakeholders and are not involved in the preparation and 
feedback process, leaves it solely in the hands of the management to decide what information 
is published in the report and how. For this reason, despite the new reporting obligations, an 
increase in the quality of information is not really expected. The interviews that have been 
conducted have shown that the prevailing view of NFIR as a mere marketing tool has been one 
of the reasons for trade unions’ previous “inactivity” in this field. Some have also admitted that 
NFIR matters do not rank the highest on their priority list as their focus in the past has been on 
the negotiations of collective agreements rather than CSR. All this gives rise to questions re-
garding the relevance of the given information. 
Still, there are great differences between countries. Some of them can be explained by the 
degree of institutionalisation of social dialogue, while others are the results of the general 
perception of the EU Directive and its possible impacts. Remarkably, in countries with a tra-
ditionally strong culture of co-determination and high degree of information and consultation 
rights, such as Belgium and Germany, the information value of NFIR is not perceived as very 
high as there are other channels for workers’ representatives to obtain the information that is 
needed. With regard to the EU Directive, the interviewees therefore do not expect any impact 
on the social dialogue. On the other hand, there is a very clear interest in the EU Directive and 
NFIR in countries with weak social dialogue structures. In Lithuania, for example, the EU Di-
rective is still perceived to be a chance, despite the fact that neither trade unions nor workers’ 
representatives had been informed about the upcoming transposition process, let alone be-
come involved in it. Since information and consultation rights for workers’ representatives are 
very limited in Lithuania, the new NFIR obligation is welcomed and connected with the hope of 
opening up a new and relevant source of information.
Another interesting finding is that the experience with existing laws on NFIR in some countries 
and especially in France, has led to more particular expectations and specific demands. This 
leads to the assumption that a certain amount of experience and expertise on the subject of 
NFIR will be required before workers’ representatives can discover a potential field of action 
relevant to their cause. However, this will not happen automatically. Rather, it requires a proac-
tive attitude towards NFIR. 
In this context, the country studies have shown that there is generally a greater advocacy for 
NFIR among trade union representatives at national level than among workers’ representatives 
at company level. However, even among trade unions, there are great differences regarding the 
perceived significance and relevance of NFIR. While representatives in Italy believed that trade 
unions should assume a vital role in the promotion of NFIR, some trade unions in Spain have 
remained dismissive of the topic. This could prove to be a critical factor, since the transposi-
tion, especially from voluntary to compulsory reporting, will require a steady diffusion of NFIR 
topics among workers and their representatives.
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Although trade unions and workers’ representatives have signalled that they perceive a po-
tential in NFIR and are generally interested in the topic, they usually lack concrete approaches 
towards the utilisation of non-financial reports. All the country studies have shown that work-
ers’ representatives are hardly ever involved in the preparation of NFIR. The content of these 
reports has therefore been formulated solely from a management perspective. The standards 
and quality have not been subject to discussion and the only reason they are so hard to assess 
is because of non-transparent procedures involved in the preparation of the reports. As long as 
this is the case, the impact of NFIR on labour relations will remain weak because the content 
and assumed quality, and thus the relevance of the information, are determinant of the poten-
tial practical value of the report. Hence, for trade unionists and workers’ representatives, it is 
important to seek an active role in the preparation process of the reports. 
Clarity 
Workers’ representatives that have been working with NFIR generally stress that the com-
plexity of the information provided is a major problem. Despite experience of several years in 
France, NFIR is still regarded as too dense and very technical. Workers’ representatives find 
it difficult to dedicate sufficient time and effort to analyse the data directly. Up until now, they 
have dedicated their own resources to selectively working on the social data they consider a 
priority, in particular, during periods of company restructuring. 
The European Works Council at Saint Gobain, for example, relies on an external consultancy 
firm to which it entrusts the data. This firm not only works on the public data, which consists 
of consolidated figures on the global level, but also on the internal reporting data, broken down 
by European country and operation. What results from such an analysis is an internal report, 
which is used in dialogue relating to social matters and, in particular, in the analysis of the em-
ployment risk, country by country. Moreover, it is used to shape a method to accompany any 
changes in the company organisation on a social level. 
In this case, the non-financial data represents a significant added value. However, for workers’ 
representatives who cannot rely on such structures and recourse for analysis, the complexity 
of the information presented could prove to be a major obstacle. As clear and understandable 
information could influence the potential practical value of NFIR just as its content and quality, 
again, workers’ representative should strive to be involved in the process of the NFIR prepara-












































IMPACT OF DIRECTIVE 2014/95/EU ON LABOUR RELATIONS –  
FOUR SCENARIOS
The “DimasoLab” Project has collected great amounts of information from 12 European coun-
tries. Describing the national labour relation systems, specifications and outcomes of legisla-
tive processes or attitudes and perceptions of stakeholders could each have been the subject 
of an independent study, with similar studies having been performed in the past. In this case, 
however, the objective was to provide a broad basis for an early assessment of the impact of 
Directive 2014/95/EU on labour relations. 
The main challenge was to reduce the complexity of the material without compromising details 
or context. Therefore, in a first step, five long and seven short country reports were condensed 
into a synthesis report. The synthesis made it possible to identify the factors which were most 
likely to determine the impact of the Directive on labour relations. Thus identified factors were 
then further elaborated. At this point, it became clear that there was not only a great variety 
among the countries but also a complex interdependence between these determining factors. 
In order to be able to depict the alternative paths for developments and their dynamics, we 
chose to apply scenario building.
Scenarios do not predict the future, instead, they explore the field of tension between today’s 
certainties and tomorrow’s uncertainties. In this way, they help to anticipate possible futures 
and prepare for them. 1 Hence, for an impact assessment at this early stage, the scenario 
method was a good choice, as it provided the necessary flexibility and room for thought exper-
iments.   
The two most important drivers for the scenarios were identified as: a) the engagement of 
trade unions and workers’ representatives and b) the binding character of policies. Engage-
ment ranges between cautious and assertive, while the boundaries for the character of policies 
are individual and collective. 
This is based on the key assumption that the companies’ response to the Directive would be 
extrinsically driven. This, in turn, leads to a minimum implementation of the policies, while all 
decisions beyond that are taken with a view to maximising company profits.    
Looking at the engagement of trade unions and workers’ representatives, our starting point 
was to assume that they were “sceptical, though not dismissive”, as this best summarises the 
interviews carried out as part of the project. The Directive marks the starting point of the bind-
ing character of the policies.
The time horizon for the scenarios was set in accordance with the 2030 Agenda for Sustaina-
ble Development. 
While developing the scenarios, we tried to follow a clear line of argumentation, taking into ac-
count the different rationales of the actors involved. In order to reduce complexity, we did not 
include all actors at every point in our scenarios. Instead, we aimed to write our scenarios in a 
way that would provide a complete picture of the interdependencies, motives and dynamics in 
line with the findings from our country studies.
1 Worker participation 2030. Four Scenarios. Michael Stollt and Sascha Meinert (Institute for Prospective Analysis e.V.)
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CAPITAL JUNGLE
»»  Focus on ecological topics and sustainable 
finance
»»  Conflicting aims between civil society actors
»»  Stakeholders timely played out against each 
other
»»  Seen as an accounting issue 
»»  Little to no practical value perceived 
»»  Marginal utilisation solely for ecological topics
»»  No particular importance for social dialogue
»»  Negative impact on labour relations
 Main challenges
»»  Influence financial sustainability ratings towards 
higher prioritisation of social and governance 
aspects
»»  Ensure investment of capital from pension funds 
and employee savings plans in accordance with 
sustainability criteria
LAUNDROMAT
»»  Customised standards at company level  
»»  Limited comparability due to fragmented reporting 
landscape 
»»  Obligatory audits to achieve minimum credibility
»»  Limited use for investors
»»  Almost no practical value for trade unions and 
workers’ representatives
»»  Interpretative authority lies with the auditor
»»  CSR awards as marketing tools used in the relations 
with customers and politicians
»»  Perception of relevant issues further divided between 
social partners
»»  Negative impact on labour relations
 Main challenges
»»  Develop analytical skills to carry out ‘social audits’  
and gain interpretative authority




»»  Development of distinct analytical capabilities
»»  Permanent multi-stakeholder coalition building 
»»  Social audits are common practice
»»  A large number of companies have to report
»»  Guidelines for reporting are weak but balanced
»»  Subjects of social dialogue broadened 
»»  Small improvements on a large horizontal axis
»»  Distinct social-ecological strategies within trade 
unions and workers’ representatives 
»»  Positive impact on labour relations 
 Main challenges
»»  Build and maintain a strong coalition with NGOs 
despite of partially conflicting aims
»»  Work towards improving the quality of NFIR content
LIGHTHOUSES
»»  Company-level driven 
»»  Different approaches lead to customisation
»»  Highly company-specific analytical skills developed
»»  Vertical integration through EWCs and supply chains
»»  Utilisation mostly for employment and social topics
»»  Practical value perceived very differently 
»»  Positive impact on labour relations in a small number 
of large companies
 Main challenges
»»  Adapt and transfer blueprints from large lighthouses 
to small and medium-sized companies





Directive 2014/95/EU and its transposition did not fulfil the initial expectations of trade unions and 
workers’ representatives. Nevertheless, obligatory NFIR seemed to have at least some potential for 
their cause. Trade unions and workers’ representatives thus decided to monitor how NFIR would de-
velop in the following years and then start to devise strategies. The weak guidelines and the absence 
of critical NFIR analysts allowed companies and the finance industry to adapt NFIR to capital market 
needs. Instead of improving transparency with regard to environmental protection and the improve-
ment of social rights, the way the reporting was designed solely benefited investor relations. This be-
came even more apparent as the growing sector of sustainable finance increasingly gained in impor-
tance. Because sustainable finance often focuses only on the ecological benefits, rather than social 
and employment issues, this resulted in a strong emphasis on ecological topics. After the first years, 
trade unions and workers’ representatives therefore perceived NFIR as mainly serving the particular 
interests of the capital markets with very little practical value for their work. Afterwards, the efforts by 
unions to work with NFIR or to influence the further development of binding policies steadily declined. 
This provided companies and the financial industry with an opportunity to permanently shape the fu-
ture of NFIR to suit their own needs. Trade unions and workers’ representatives had ceased in their at-
tempts to exert serious influence on the reporting standards and, without that, there was no lobby for 
labour related matters. With fewer parties at the table, there was less controversy in the consultation 
process for the revision of the Directive and what resulted from this was an agreement which includ-
ed binding reporting guidelines. However, the content of the guidelines cemented the shift towards 
a solely “green” perception of sustainability. This generated even more interest and ambition among 
NGOs dealing with environmental issues. Soon, bodies for “ecological-partners” were established, 
institutionalising the ecological dialogue between companies and environmental NGOs. This devel-
opment led to conflict lines appearing between trade unions / workers’ representatives and NGOs. 
As they started to compete for influence, the interests of trade unions, workers’ representatives and 
NGOs were also timely played out against each other. The only winners are the non-financial rating 
agencies, which have gained importance for investor relations.
Today, trade unions and workers’ representatives perceive NFIR as an accounting issue only important 
for capital markets and some environmental activists. As a result, trade unions and workers’ repre-
sentatives not only lack interest in NFIR but also the skills to deal with it. They make only marginal 
use of NFIR for ecological topics. The NGOs participating in the “ecological dialogue” are increasingly 
seen as competitors. There is no longer any aspiration on the part of trade unions and workers’ repre-
sentatives for NFIR to play a significant role in social dialogue. Neither is there a desire for fostering 
multi-stakeholder coalitions. Moreover, they are alarmed that the one-dimensional perception of 
sustainability might be working against them in the long-term. The impact of Directive 2014/95/EU on 
labour relations in 2030 is negative. This is because of little to no practical value for trade unions and 
workers’ representatives combined with growing importance of other stakeholders
»»  Focus on ecological topics and  
sustainable finance
»»  Conflicting aims between civil society actors
»»  Stakeholders timely played out against  
each other
»»  Seen as an accounting issue 
»»  Little to no practical value perceived 
»»  Marginal utilisation for solely ecological topics
»»  No particular importance for social dialogue
»»  Negative impact on labour relations
 Main challenges for trade unions  
and workers’ representatives:
»»  Influence financial sustainability ratings towards 
higher prioritisation of social and governance 
aspects
»»  Ensure investment of capital from pension funds 





Directive 2014/95/EU and its transposition did not fulfil the initial expectations of trade unions and 
workers’ representatives. The EU Directive on NFIR was expected to improve the image of CSR, bring-
ing about a shift from mere public relations matter to serious business, but it ended up being limited in 
scope and with too little binding character in terms of the means of reporting. The critics, who had seen 
this coming, were assured that NFIR would not lead to any improvements for civil society. Those who 
had previously hoped for progress were disappointed and mostly decided to direct their efforts towards 
other policy areas. This left the playing field to a growing industry of consultants, offering their services 
to companies: after all, the weak binding guidelines had left a lot of room for interpretation and creativ-
ity. Greenwashing, redwashing or whitewashing? Just name the colour of the company image you are 
looking to achieve and they took care of the communication strategy that went along with it. This also 
fuelled wild growth of “customised standards”, which gave rise to a fragmented reporting landscape with 
little comparability. Non-financial rating agencies and investors were, of course, aware of this develop-
ment as well. If this did not change, NFIR would remain of limited use for investment decisions. 
When the revision approached, non-financial rating agencies and investor organisations thus started to 
lobby for obligatory audits by independent third parties. This was supposed to be an effective measure 
to improve the reliability of NFIR, effectively making it sufficient for risk management purposes. There 
was no noteworthy active opposition from trade unions and workers’ representatives or civil society; 
some even hoped that this would finally lead to NFIR serving the long-hoped purpose of improving eco-
logical, social and governance issues. When the first audit reports started to appear, it became clear 
that this would most likely not be the case. Instead, the interpretative authority over NFIR now lay with 
branches of the same consulting agencies that had put them together in the first place. Of course, they 
were not allowed to do reporting and auditing for the same company, but still, there was too much de-
pendency in other business fields to guarantee complete impartiality.  
The scope of NFIR today is still restrained to those companies which were required to report when the 
directive was first introduced. Beyond that, only two types of companies make use of NFIR: those who 
consider sustainability to be at the core of their brand and those who have a lot of dirty laundry. Trade 
unions and workers’ representatives are therefore not working with NFIR in a way different from that 
in 2016. Their analytical capabilities are limited to basic assessments. They do not carry out branch 
or country comparisons as these appear to be too costly to achieve. What the basic assessments do 
identify, however, are some fields of reporting where the perception of trade unions and workers’ rep-
resentatives differs most from that presented in NFIR and the audit results. Nonetheless, the results of 
trade union assessments are mostly used to criticise the incongruence of the many CSR awards, whose 
number has steadily increased over the past years. This is because CSR awards have proven to be an 
effective means of brand building in the eyes of customers and politicians. NFIR is left without almost 
any practical value for trade unions, workers’ representatives, and social dialogue. Instead, it is increas-
ingly becoming more of an obstacle when management refers to it. The impact of Directive 2014/95/EU 
on labour relations in 2030 is negative because it has further divided the social partners and weakened 
the interpretative authority of trade unions and workers’ representatives.
»»  Customised standards at company level 
»»  Limited comparability due to fragmented 
reporting landscape 
»»  Obligatory audits to achieve minimum credibility
»»  Limited use for investors
»»  Almost no practical value for trade unions and 
workers’ representatives
»»  Interpretative authority lies with the auditor
»»  CSR awards as marketing tools used in the 
relations with customers and politicians
»»  Perception of relevant issues further divided 
between social partners
»»  Negative impact on labour relations
Main challenges for trade unions and workers’ 
representatives:
»»  Develop analytical skills to carry out ‘social 
audits’ and gain interpretative authority
»»  Enforce a restrictive interpretation of 




Directive 2014/95/EU and its transposition did not fulfil the initial expectations of trade unions and 
workers’ representatives. Nevertheless, obligatory NFIR seemed to have at least some potential for 
their cause. Trade unions and workers’ representatives decided to start utilising NFIR in those branches 
and companies in which they were already well organised. They concentrated on establishing voluntary 
agreements that went beyond the legal framework and, most importantly, specified the role of trade 
unions and workers’ representatives. It was possible to realise this with rather few resources as without 
having to establish any new structures. The company agreements resulted in a wide range of “laboratory 
spaces” focusing on different topics. While some set their priorities on strengthening the position of the 
European Works Councils (EWC) in the consultation processes, others tried to push for the integration of 
supply chains into NFIR or the extension of the list of topics to be covered. All those efforts were under-
taken in large companies only, which resulted in an inhomogeneous picture of NFIR. While some pioneer 
reports were ambitious and of high quality, the broad majority significantly lacked substance. Further-
more, the individual approaches led to a wide range of customised standards, complicating branch and 
country comparisons.
When the revision of the Directive came closer, trade unions and workers’ representatives decided to 
concentrate on two demands. Looking at their experience so far, it seemed realistic to explicitly require 
that EWCs be part of the NFIR consultations in places where such councils existed. The other, much 
more ambitious demand, was for a “European Law on the Duty of Vigilance” following the French exam-
ple. Both would only concern the largest companies, most of which were already applying somewhat 
similar practices and thus the objections were not expected to be very strong. At the same time, trade 
unions and workers’ representatives were hoping for a trickle-down effect, on a transnational scale 
as well as on the business side. They achieved a partial success, as both demands were met, but the 
threshold for the “European Law on the Duty of Vigilance” was set at 50.000 employees. With all this 
already in place, trade unions in some sectors were able to negotiate social partner agreements that 
specified a small set of minimum reporting standards and key performance indicators for employment, 
social and supply chain issues. After all, it would make life easier for the management as well, now that 
trade unions and workers’ representatives were already actively involved.
Today, in a small number of companies, NFIR is highly utilised in social dialogue. Typically, those compa-
nies are found within the largest 5 % in Europe and confined to specific sectors. In the other 95 %, NFIR 
plays, if any, only a marginal role in social dialogue. In those 5% of companies, NFIR has helped to push 
employment and social issues vertically. In most cases, ecological and governance issues are being 
addressed by trade unions and workers’ representatives as a by-product only. Highly company-specific 
analytical skills have been developed by trade unions and workers’ representatives, enabling for detailed 
and complex in-depth analysis. Trade unions and workers’ representatives thus perceive the practical 
value of NFIR very differently, depending on the company size. Some argue that those pioneering com-
panies were the ones which already had historically well-functioning social dialogue and thus the impact 
of the Directive was very limited. Others believe that the lighthouses that have been created this way 
will in future be used as blueprints in negotiations and legislative processes. The impact of Directive 
2014/95/EU on labour relations in 2030 is positive in a small number of large companies.
thouses
»»  Company-level driven 
»»  Different approaches lead to customisation
»»  Highly company-specific analytical skills 
developed
»»  Vertical integration through EWCs and  
supply chains
»»  Utilisation mostly for employment and  
social topics
»»  Practical value perceived very differently
»»  Positive impact on labour relations in a  
small number of large companies
Main challenges for trade unions and  
workers’ representatives:
»»  Adapt and transfer blueprints from large 
lighthouses to small and medium-sized 
companies





Directive 2014/95/EU and its transposition did not fulfil the initial expectations of trade unions and 
workers’ representatives. Nevertheless, obligatory NFIR seemed to have at least some potential for their 
cause. Trade unions and workers’ representatives decided that they could not wait for too long before 
starting to act, otherwise NFIR would run the risk of soon being utilised by capital market actors only. But 
where to start? The absence of binding standards for NFIR resulted in individual and complex reports, 
while analytical resources were scarce. However, NFIR could only ever be of any practical value if trade 
unions and workers’ representatives were able to make the content usable and assess the quality across 
countries and branches. In order to deal with this, trade unions and workers’ representatives timely joined 
forces with NGOs on national and European levels to establish expert networks on NFIR. Soon, it became 
clear that they had different perspectives on many topics, but at this stage, the practical benefits out-
weighed ideological conflict lines. First success stories started to appear where trade unions, workers’ 
representatives and NGOs were able to influence the publication of NFIR or use it for bargaining and in-
dividual campaigns. Most coalitions remained project-oriented, dissolving soon after they had achieved 
their short-term goal. 
Still, one thing remained especially unsatisfactory for trade unions and workers’ representatives. The 
threshold of 500 employees combined with the criteria for revenue, balance sheet totals and types of 
enterprises drastically limited the number of companies within the scope. Lowering the bar would really 
make a difference but trade unions and workers’ representatives would not be able to drive this change 
alone. A joint effort with other stakeholders would be key. Putting aside their different demands regarding 
the content of NFIR, a broad “Transparency Alliance” for expanding NFIR obligations to a larger number 
of companies was established at European level. Even a lot of consulting agencies supported this idea, 
as they believed it would stimulate their business activities. The timing played out well. Because the 
“Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development” had until then fallen short, politicians felt pressure to act. In 
addition, the narrative of the administrative burden resulting from NFIR had lost some of its footing. This 
was primarily thanks to research on the situation in France, Denmark and Sweden, where the Directive had 
already been transposed to varying extents. In a well-coordinated strategic approach, the Transparency 
Alliance managed to enforce its demand during the revision of the Directive. 
Thereafter, the number of companies falling within the scope increased significantly, giving NFIR a boost. 
Utilising NFIR still does not enable great leaps, but in those countries and companies where there was 
little to no information before, it helps to achieve improvements. It has become common practice for trade 
unions and workers’ representatives, who are well-recognised as stakeholders in NFIR, to carry out “so-
cial audits” as a counterbalance to commercial rating agencies. Permanent coalitions with NGOs help to 
keep NFIR mostly free from conflicts of interest in the civil society, driving the development of clear so-
cial-ecological strategies within trade unions and workers’ representatives. NFIR thus plays an accepted 
role in labour relations, fostering them where they were weak or non-existing. Additionally, it extends the 
horizon of social dialogue to cover ecological and governance issues. The impact of Directive 2014/95/EU 
on labour relations in 2030 is positive because it has strengthened them on a horizontal axis in terms of 
coverage and topics.
»»  Development of distinct analytical capabilities
»»  Permanent multi-stakeholder coalition building
»»  Social audits are common practice
»»  A large number of companies have to report
»»  Guidelines for reporting are weak but balanced
»»  Subjects of social dialogue broadened
»»  Small improvements on a large horizontal axis
»»  Distinct social-ecological strategies within 
trade unions and workers’ representatives 
»»  Positive impact on labour relations 
Main challenges for trade unions  
and workers’ representatives:
»»  Build and maintain a strong coalition with  
NGOs despite of partially conflicting aims






Name  Antonio Ferrer Márquez
Country  Spain
Organization  Union Institute of Work, Environment and Health 
(ISTAS-CCOO)
What is your personal motivation for working on topics related to 
non-financial reporting?
As a union technician, my main motivation is to inform and sensitise 
workers about the importance of these issues to achieve an improve-
ment of their working conditions, the environmental behaviour and 
social impact of companies and the important role that workers can 
and should play in this context.
When did you first start working on topics related to non-financial 
reporting?
I started working in this field in 2004, promoting the access of workers 
to environmental information of companies and work centres within 
the framework of environmental management and communication 
tools used for companies (environmental management systems, emis-
sions reports, environmental permits, etc). In 2009, at the request of 
my organisation, I did my first analysis of the environmental informa-
tion contained in a sustainability report of a large Spanish global com-
pany. In 2014, I coordinated a European Union project on the participa-
tion of workers in CSR policies, in which one of the objectives was to 
train workers’ representatives to analyse the sustainability reports of 
their companies.
What has changed since then?
The importance given by companies to what and how they report has 
been growing in recent years, to the point that sustainability reports 
have become a tool for management and, in many cases, for business 
marketing. The information contained in the NFIR has been increas-
ing in amount and adapting, gradually, in response to the demands of 
some of the stakeholders (investors and shareholders mainly) and the 
growing social awareness of of these issues. But the disclosure pro-
cess continues to be characterised, to a large extent, by voluntariness, 
unilateralism and self-regulation, and it is driven by companies mainly, 
with little influence and involvement on the part of the stakeholders.
What benefits can trade unions in particular draw from non-financial 
information?
The first benefit is the opportunity to obtain broad and diverse infor-
mation (albeit sometimes imprecise) which can be useful for the work 
of the unions on topics such as the working conditions in the company 
and in the subcontracting chain, the management of the environmen-
tal impact and the improvement of relationships and communication 
with civil society.
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The NFIR are a manifestation of CSR and, in 
this framework, the role of workers and their 
representatives should be to participate and 
collaborate in the management of the com-
pany’s impact on society and in the way it 
returns benefits to society.
What is the most remarkable difference in 
your country regarding non-financial report-
ing compared to other European countries?
In Spain, there is a long tradition of disclos-
ing NFIR by large companies, mainly on a 
voluntary basis. The number of companies 
disclosing NFIR is relevant (more than 450). It 
is also important to note that there is an advi-
sory and consultative body on CSR issues, the 
State Council for Corporative Social Respon-
sibility (CERSE), which is the first of its kind 
in Europe.
In CERSE, administration, employers organi-
sations, trade union organisations and institu-
tions with specific interests and responsibili-
ties in CSR are represented.
Likewise, Law 2/2011 on Sustainable Econ-
omy collects several provisions to promote 
CSR policies regarding administration and 
companies. For instance, government limited 
companies and public corporate entities un-
der government administration must submit 
annual corporate governance and sustainabil-
ity reports according to commonly accepted 
standards. However, for a couple of years, the 
activity of CERSE has been paralysed by the 
Government’s political decision and the ap-
plication of the Law on Sustainable Economy 
has also been limited.
What has been the biggest setback for work-
ing on non-financial information?
One of the biggest setbacks was that the 
activity of CERSE was stopped, as I have 
mentioned before. In this body, many people, 
including colleagues from my organisation, 
were developing very important work on is-
sues of non-financial information and CSR.
How do you see the future of non-financial 
reporting?
In my opinion, more and more companies 
will start disclosing NFIR and the information 
obligations will also be greater. However, the 
speed and depth of the changes will depend, 
to a large extent, on the commitment by both 
social organisations in general and significant 
stakeholders, as well as the pressure that 
these will exert. As I have mentioned before, 
one of the main drivers for this is in the cap-
ital market itself, where, for example, we are 
currently witnessing an explosion of green 
and social bonds and financing committed 
to the environment. This will undoubtedly be 
an impetus for companies to increase their 
transparency and their obligations regarding 
non-financial information.
What should be the next steps for unions in 
dealing with non-financial reporting?
NFI reports must be a vector for union par-
ticipation in CSR policies and a tool for trade 
union actions.
At company level, unions must sensitise work-
places about the importance of workers and 
their representatives becoming involved in 
these issues. The purpose must be to validate 
and verify the information generated and pub-
lished by the company and to provide the union 
with a point of view, without endorsing false 
processes, and ensuring that what is com-
municated corresponds to the commitments 
made by the company in its CSR policies.
This is what could motivate an improvement 
in the quality of reports and a greater impact 
on labour relations at the company level.
What are your political demands for the fur-
ther development of non-financial reporting?
In Spain, transposition of Directive 2014/95/
EC does not go beyond the requirements 
established in the Directive. However, as a 
result of pressure from social organisations 
and political parties, it is predicted that the 
Spanish Parliament will discuss and approve 
a new rule on non-financial information in 
the coming months which, according to the 
commitment reached, will go beyond what is 
established in Directive 2014/95/EU. 
My main political demand in this context is 
that the future regulation consolidates and 
broadens the obligation to publish NFIR by 
companies, quantitatively and qualitatively 
improving the information contained in the 
reports and recognising the role that workers 




Name  Jan Cremers
Country  The Netherlands
Organisation  Amsterdam Institute of Advanced Labour  
Studies/Tilburg Law School
What is your personal motivation for working on topics related to 
non-financial reporting?
As a member of several European networks that deal with compa-
ny law, I have published reports and articles in this area. This fits 
in with a broader analysis of the possibilities for a workers’ voice 
in company law. 
When did you first start working on topics related to non-financial 
reporting for the first time?
I started working in this field in 2011 as member of a network 
dealing with the disclosure of non-financial information. The then 
existing SEEurope network, originally installed as a group that 
assisted the Europe Trade Union Institute (ETUI) with analyses 
and research in the field of the European Company Statute (SE), 
decided to follow in a critical manner on the research into non-fi-
nancial information which had been commissioned by DG Internal 
Market and Services at the European Commission. We surveyed 
the legal framework and practices in the 28 EU countries regard-
ing non-financial and sustainability-related reporting by European 
companies and the role and involvement of trade union represent-
atives in this form of reporting.
What has changed since then?
In the spring of 2011, DG Internal Market and Services installed an 
Expert Group on the disclosure of non-financial information by EU 
companies. The Expert Group was established to provide expert 
advice in the context of the impact assessment being planned by the 
EC of the disclosure of non-financial information by companies. In 
the work of the EC Group and in the commissioned research, there 
was no reference to non-financial reporting addressed to the work-
force, although, according to EU Directive 2003/51 EC, annual com-
pany reports and consolidated reports should not be restricted to the 
financial aspects of a company’s business. 
Therefore, in that same year, we started a SEEurope inquiry into the 
current legal framework and current practices with regard to non-fi-
nancial reporting on sustainability-related issues in various Europe-
an countries. This led to the ETUI publication Non-financial reporting 
beyond the strict minimum: is the workforce a well-informed stake-
holder? 1 The report served as a background paper for the work by 




What benefits can trade unions in particular 
draw from non-financial information?
They can use it to become more involved in 
the environmental debate and develop en-
vironmental policies for their industries. In 
some places, this has already happened, as 
we have shown in our publication. Also, it 
could help to stress how the adoption of a 
sustainable long-term approach by compa-
nies, corporate governance, CSR is linked to 
employee participation.
What is the most remarkable difference in 
your country regarding non-financial report-
ing compared to other European countries?
Notwithstanding extensive rights for workers’ 
representatives in general, as described in 
the country report, non-financial reporting 
continues to be a part of a unilateral process. 
Items going beyond the workplace are scarce-
ly reported and the reporting tends to remain 
a management prerogative.
What has been the biggest setback for work-
ing on non-financial information?
The national implementation in the Nether-
lands was too ‘copy and paste’.
How do you see the future of non-financial 
reporting?
Worker representatives are not prominently 
involved in the development of reporting sys-
tems. The risk is that this aspect will remain a 
matter of symbolic lip service. The result will 
be that workers representatives will no longer 
strive to make use of what is otherwise an 
important source of information.  
What should be the next steps for unions in 
dealing with non-financial reporting?
The suggestions in the 2011 report are still 
topical. There are examples in which the un-
ions have been trying to clarify the provisions 
on non-financial performance indicators. This 
can lead to participation in national stand-
ardisation or in rating institutions, or to union 
campaigns in favour of the development of 
national sustainability codes. 
Also, there are bridges missing between ‘ordi-
nary’ workplace-related issues and sustaina-
bility goals. The European Works Councils in 
particular can have an important monitoring 
role in verifying the correct application of 
reporting policies.
What are your political demands for the fur-
ther development of non-financial reporting?
In order to be more than a unilateral top-
down process, the participation of workers’ 
representatives at the highest level of deci-
sion-making is the only guarantee of a more 
equal footing in reporting issues.
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NON-FINANCIAL 
REPORTING PREVIOUS TO 
DIRECTIVE 2014/95/EU
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This first chapter gives an overview of the various legal provisions and practices with regard to 
sustainability or non-financial reporting prior to Directive 2014/95/EU in the twelve countries 
that were the subject of examination in the DimasoLab Project. It also shows the extent of in-
volvement of workers’ representatives and trade unions in non-financial reporting. 
Generally speaking, one can find some form of non-financial reporting in all the countries con-
cerned. However, a distinction can be made between countries where previous national legal 
obligations to disclose non-financial information already existed, in some cases even dating 
back to the 1970s (France, UK, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Poland, Austria) and countries 
where non-financial reporting obligations did not exist at all or were only applied to a small and 
specific group of entities so that this type of reporting had mostly taken place on a voluntary 
basis (Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Lithuania). We will first concentrate in detail on 
the voluntary reporting practices and the involvement of workers’ representatives in Spain and, 
subsequently, present our findings in relation to the other countries. 
Sustainability reporting in Spain
Since the Law on Sustainable Economy was introduced in 2011, Spanish state-owned com-
panies and public corporate entities under government administrations have been obliged to 
prepare annual sustainability reports disclosing non-financial information using commonly 
accepted standards. In reality, however, this obligation was not fulfilled by all entities that fell 
within the scope of the law. All the more surprising is the fact that in 2017 87% of the 100 
largest corporations and limited companies in Spain, including all the 35 listed companies 
(IBEX35), produced such reports, although they were not legally required to do so. 60% of 
these companies even published a non-financial report separate from its annual management 
report. Thus, Spain can be seen as a pioneer when it comes to voluntary reporting.
Spanish enterprises have proactively adopted Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategies 
and standards. With 75% of the 100 largest companies in Spain following the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) standard, Spain ranked among the top 10 countries with regard to the level of 
implementation of the GRI guidelines. 
The accounts given by the companies were predominantly consolidated reports of parent com-
panies or business groups based in Spain. Only 8% included specific information from daugh-
ter companies as well. The reports covered environmental, social and labour related matters, 
as well as aspects of human rights, anti-corruption, local communities, clients and the supply 
chain. However, information on the supply chain constitutes the most deficient aspect covered. 
By contrast, Key Performance Indicators (KPI) were included in the majority of cases, while all 
reports mention stakeholders, with the most relevant ones being investors and shareholders, 
as well as environmental and civil rights initiatives, and initiatives in the third world. Trade un-
ions were only mentioned in exceptional cases. Many of the IBEX35 companies organised an 
annual meeting with stakeholders, though the participation rates remained very low. Disclosure 
to stakeholders was most commonly practiced via press releases and the facilitation of access 
to the management report on the company’s website. With no organised dialogue, the reports 
were clearly unidirectional. 
The Spanish government promoted the development of CSR policy through the establishment 
of the State Council on Corporate Social Responsibility (“Consejo Estatal de Responsabilidad 
Social de las Empresas - CERSE) in 2008. This advisory and consultative body under the super-
vision of the Ministry of Employment and Social Security was created with the aim of bringing 
together representatives of various interest groups linked to CSR, with the purpose of moni-
toring the development and implementation of CSR policies and reporting on initiatives and 
regulations in this field. Its objective also included the search for greater standardisation in the 
reports that companies and organisations published voluntarily.
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Involvement of Spanish workers’ representatives in CSR promotion
Another outstanding characteristic regarding Spain and its sustainability reporting was the 
strong involvement of Spanish workers’ representatives in CSR promotion. There was a pro-
gressive union decision to interfere in policies and practices related to CSR. At institutional 
level, Spain’s largest trade union, Comisiones Obreras (CCOO), and other trade unions actively 
participated in the aforementioned CERSE by, for instance, bringing in proposals for indicators 
to be used in the reporting, or coordinating working groups. Moreover, unions had influenced 
the Spanish Strategy on CSR by succeeding in having unions explicitly recognised as a stake-
holder group. The Confederation of Trade Unions of CCOO as well as some Territorial Confed-
erations and the State Federation of CCOO had experts carrying out and unfolding work that 
had begun to translate into union action in some companies.
At the height of the activities in 2010, the Executive Committee of CCOO approved a series of 
CSR criteria to be included in the negotiation of collective agreements, with the employer’s side 
coming to accept a positive attitude towards the inclusion of some of these recommendations. 
However, with the political changes in 2011, which resulted in a more conservative government 
and the labour market reform in 2012, all these attempts were abandoned.
Despite this, there are notable examples of clauses already incorporated into collective agree-
ments or Global Framework Agreements, which are:
»»  the Collective Banking Agreement (2015-2018) including an article regarding 
social responsibility and socially responsible investment, 
»»  the Global Agreement for Offices in the GAMESA Group signed by the Spanish 
manufacturing company GAMESA and the Global Union Federation IndutriALL to 
reinforce the inclusion of social, labour and environmental aspects in CSR poli-
cies and corporate codes of conduct, and
»»  the General Agreement of the Chemical Industry stating whether CSR actions or 
initiatives are being carried out which must be reported to the workers’ represen-
tatives periodically, indicating their possible impact on the working conditions.
Information and consultation rights of Spanish workers’ representatives
Within companies, workers’ representatives are supported through comprehensive information 
and consultation rights. The basis for individual and collective labour relations in Spain is the 
Workers’ Statute which establishes in its Article 64 the right for works councils to be informed 
and consulted by employers on issues that might affect workers, as well as on the company’s 
performance and employment evolution. It further stipulates that the works council must be 
informed quarterly on specific CSR aspects, such as recent and expected developments in the 
company’s activities, including environmental measures with direct repercussion on employ-
ment, as well as statistical data on absenteeism and its causes, occupational injuries and sick-
nesses and their consequences, work accident rates, specific or periodical studies on the work 
environment and the preventive mechanisms implemented. 
Members of works councils are also entitled to receive information, at least on an annual basis, 
on the companies’ implementation of equal gender opportunity policies, which must include 
data on the proportion of male and female workers across different professional categories, 
and on any measures adopted to promote gender equality or implementation of gender equality 
programmes.  Furthermore, works councils must also be granted access to balance sheets and 
income statements, annual reports and, in the case of shareholder‐owned companies, to the 
same information as that provided to the shareholders. 
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Article 67 not only lays down the rights of works councils but also their competencies and 
obligations related to CSR and sustainability, such as monitoring the compliance with labour 
and social security regulations and the implementation and compliance with equal opportunity 
principles for men and women as well as occupational health and safety conditions. It also 
foresees the participation, as defined by collective agreements, in the management of the 
company’s social projects that benefit employees and their families and the collaboration with 
the company managers to implement all necessary measures to maintain and increase produc-
tivity and environmental sustainability, if such terms are established by collective bargaining, 
as well as measures to improve the work‐life balance of the employees.
Despite the involvement of Spanish trade unions in the development of CSR policies and the 
comprehensive information and consultation rights of works councils, Spanish companies that 
publish non-financial reports do not consider these reports as a means for social dialogue. The 
involvement of workers’ representatives in the elaboration and discussion of the contents is 
almost non-existent as most companies only provide workers’ representative with non-finan-
cial reports after they have been finalised, never including them in the process of preparation. 
Non-financial reporting is therefore to be seen as purely unilateral, which is a feature that we 
will also find in the other countries examined. 
Voluntary non-financial reporting prior to Directive 2014/95/EU
In the Netherlands, the government has been very active in promoting CSR and encouraging 
companies in various other ways than formal reporting requirements. In 2004, the Dutch Min-
istry of Economic Affairs set up an expert network organisation for CSR (MOV Nederland) with 
the aim of incorporating CSR into the core activities of Dutch companies by providing guide-
lines and tools to put CSR and non-financial reporting into practice. 
Every year, the government conducts a study, the Transparency Benchmark, on the content 
and quality of CSR reports by Dutch companies, both public and private, assessing around 500 
reports and awarding a prize to the company with the highest score. The Transparency Bench-
mark is set to stimulate self-initiative in the business world and is therefore in accordance with 
the Dutch government’s general approach towards CSR, which is mainly based on self-regula-
tion, with apparent success in quantitative terms.
According to a KPMG survey, more than 80% of Dutch companies disclosed non-financial 
information in 2015. However, taking a closer look at the completeness and quality of the in-
formation provided, there is still a great need for improvement. In 2016, a pilot study involving 
26 companies was conducted among leading Dutch companies with a view to assessing their 
compliance with the obligations as formulated by Directive 2014/95/EU. The result was that 
only 50% of the companies included a non-financial statement in their 2015 management re-
port and none of the companies met all the requirements of the EU Directive. The companies 
reported to a much lesser degree on matters related to human rights, bribery and anti-corrup-
tion, as compared with social and environmental matters. The researchers concluded that most 
of the companies had achieved significant maturity in terms of social and environmental mat-
ters but very few had experience in providing risk information relevant to other aspects.
Trade unions in the Netherlands stress the importance of non-financial reporting. In the past, 
the social partners in the Netherlands have, both separately and jointly, produced several 
statements on sustainability and CSR. On the other hand, until now, workers’ representatives 
have not been prominently involved in the development of reporting systems, despite having 
extensive participation and consultation rights granted by the Dutch Works Council Acts (De 
Wet op de Ondernemingsraden – WOR). According to the WOR, employers should provide the 
works councils with information concerning the activities and financial results of the enter-
prise as well as with general employee related information (e.g., the number of employees, 
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working hours, type of contract, etc.). Works councils also have the right of information on 
broader topics such as diversity, anti-discrimination, environmental issues as well as the right 
to advice on outsourcing, supply chain management and measures related to the environment. 
Very often, these aspects are an integral part of investment decisions, in relation to which the 
works council also has a right of advice. Furthermore, the WOR formulates several tasks with 
regard to equal treatment, general human rights and environmental issues and provides works 
councils with a general right to start consultations on relevant issues by submitting proposals 
and presenting their opinion. The company should not take a decision on a proposal until it 
has been discussed at least once at a consultation meeting. If the management publishes an 
environmental report, this report must be submitted to the works council for the purposes of 
discussion as soon as possible after it has been drawn up. Notwithstanding these extensive 
rights for workers’ representatives, non-financial reporting continues to be a part of a unilater-
al process. Issues going beyond the workplace are scarcely reported and the reporting tends to 
remain a management prerogative.
Another country with very strong information and consultation rights for workers’ representa-
tives is Germany. Social reporting is generally seen as part of the CSR policy and the govern-
ment has taken measures in promoting CSR and encouraging companies in different ways to 
take up CSR. The government oversees a platform for CSR, the National CSR Forum, estab-
lished in 2009 by the Ministry of Labour, consisting of 41 high-level experts from business, 
trade unions, NGOs, science and different ministries. The forum’s main aim is advising the 
Federal Government on the further development of the CSR strategy and drawing up recom-
mendations on individual topics. However, the last meeting was held in January 2015, although 
meetings should take place twice a year. So far, no recommendations regarding non-financial 
reporting have been made. 
The German Corporate Code presents essential statutory regulations for the management and 
supervision of German listed companies and contains internationally and nationally acknowl-
edged standards for good and responsible corporate governance in the form of recommenda-
tions and suggestions. Since 2015, a requirement to provide certain non-financial information 
in the annual management report has been in place, albeit only if there is a significant impact 
on the economic situation of the company. 
Furthermore, in December 2016, following a two-year consultation process with civil society, 
business and government representatives, the government adopted the National Action Plan 
on Business and Human Rights. However, it has become apparent that, just like the Dutch, the 
German approach towards CSR and non-financial reporting is solely based on self-regulation. 
Nevertheless, some large companies from the chemical, energy, telecommunication and trans-
port sectors have plenty of experience in non-financial reporting as these companies voluntar-
ily started to produce social responsibility reports (Sozialbilanzen) as far back as the 1970s. In 
the following decade, the same companies started publishing their first environmental reports. 
They realised that in order to strengthen their reputation among their customers, the work-
force, the general public and the authorities, companies were required to give account of their 
policies and impacts on society. 
Data from the Corporate Register and the Global Compact shows that in 2016 more than 550 
German companies disclosed non-financial information, though other surveys by consulting 
institutes and rating agencies suggest that the number is, in fact, much lower. An Ernest & 
Young study in 2013 came to the conclusion that 68% of the top 100 German companies were 
disclosing non-financial information. According to a 2016 study conducted by the Institut für 
ökologische Wirtschaftsforschung (IÖW), an independent ecological research institute, the 
number of companies providing non-financial information amounts to 300 – 320. The same 
study states that the 150 largest companies only constitute less than a half (48%) of these 
companies. Determining exact figures is therefore not easy. Much clearer is the fact that the 
main reference framework for reporting is the GRI, however, only a small minority of compa-
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nies present KPI. Most common topics covered are those related to environmental, social and 
employee matters, but also to human rights. Corruption and bribery issues are not covered in 
great detail. At any rate, the most deficient topic is the information on labour rights and human 
rights in the supply chain. 
For workers’ representatives in Germany, the Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungs-
gesetz) establishes comprehensive information and consultation rights for works councils and, 
in companies with more than 100 employees, for the economic committee (Wirtschaftsauss-
chuss) of the works council. Additionally, works councils at group level (Konzernbetriebsrat) 
have special information rights. In large shareholder companies or limited companies, there 
is co-determination on the basis of parity within the supervisory board. Despite the extensive 
information and consultation rights, there is no formal involvement of workers’ representatives 
in preparing non-financial reports. There is no formal or organised procedure with regard to the 
relevance analysis while preparing the non-financial information, nor is there any formal con-
sultation with regard to establishing the materiality matrix. Nevertheless, works councils are 
indirectly involved as the contents of non-financial reports are often the topics of discussion 
and consultation between the management and the works council in their regular consultation 
meetings, although non-financial reporting as such is not discussed in a comprehensive man-
ner. Since it is mandatory to inform the economic committee of the works council about the 
economic situation, a majority of workers’ representatives also have the opportunity to read 
and discuss the report and its content, albeit only once it has been published.
The numbers for voluntary disclosure in Italy are drastically lower compared with Germany. 
With no legal requirements to disclose and no universal definition of non-financial information, 
recent surveys suggest that barely 36% of companies in Italy disclose non-financial informa-
tion. In doing so, however, they produce a great variety of documents in terms of shape, con-
tent and quality. 
Listed companies make up 25% of the total number and show a higher rate of reporting com-
pared with non-listed companies. The manufacturing, utilities and finance sectors represent 
71% of the total enterprises that produce a report, whereas the information and construction 
sectors are clearly lagging behind at only 10%. Even though the reports differ greatly, more 
than 86% use the GRI reporting framework for orientation, at least to a certain extent. However, 
in some cases, there is no reference to a specific standard whatsoever. No major efforts re-
garding the promotion of non-financial reporting are to be seen on the part of the government. 
In 2009, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies established a working group that conducted 
a study of 30 company reports, identifying and selecting the best practice examples according 
to three parameters that had been proclaimed as the pillars for sustainable development of so-
cially responsible enterprises, namely economic, social and environmental parameters. Apart 
from that, there have not been any proactive activities. 
The same applies with regard to Italian trade unions. Trade unions sporadically implement 
non-financial reporting practices through collective bargaining, however, matters of non-fi-
nancial reporting are not a priority on the trade unions’ agenda. There is little knowledge about 
Directive 2014/95/EU and the new obligations. Up until now, workers’ representatives have not 
become too involved in the production of non-financial reports and they often have little infor-
mation about it. Furthermore, they lack knowledge of the criteria and standards and are not 
able to point out the strengths and weaknesses of previous reports. 
Non-financial reporting is considered a mere management duty, with the reporting seen as an 
abstract document produced basically for marketing aims. One can conclude that the involve-
ment of workers’ representatives in the non-financial reporting process is absent, especially 
due to the prevalence of a marketing approach towards non-financial reporting. 
Similar low numbers of voluntary reporting can be found in Lithuania, where companies are 
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generally unwilling to provide any information unless required to do so by law. The only exam-
ples of companies that disclose information to employees and society voluntarily are interna-
tional companies or large companies that have international relations. According to the Lithua-
nian corporate financial reporting law, companies are only required to prepare an annual report 
that mostly covers financial aspects. 
CSR initiatives started as early as 2004, however, by 2016, only 20%-25% of the 140 compa-
nies with more than 500 employees were preparing non-financial reports on a voluntary basis. 
The numbers are increasing, albeit very slowly. Although 44 legal entities have joined the UN 
Global Compact Initiative, only three of the reports followed a reporting standard, which was 
the GRI standard, though more than 60% did include KPI, at the very least. Despite an increase 
in the disclosure of information regarding human rights and anti-corruption matters in recent 
years, these topics are still underrepresented and not a single report covered all non-financial 
aspects, nor has any of the reports been audited by an external third party. 
Annual CSR awards are given out according to the criteria approved by the Ministry of Social 
Security and Labour. One criterion is the involvement of employees and target groups in the 
information and consultation process, however, target groups are mostly defined by companies 
as investors and shareholders and only a few hold consultations with their employees.
The common practice in Lithuania is to avoid consultations with trade unions regarding non-fi-
nancial information. The Ministry of Social Security and Labour has established a special di-
vision concerning issues of CSR, however, in the opinion of trade unions, this division is more 
declarative than functional, which is supported by the fact that it has not published a single 
report since 2012. The same Ministry has set up the Committee for Supervision of Implemen-
tation of the National Programme for Development of CSR for the years 2009-2013, though it 
would appear that this Committee never actually took up its work. In 2013, the Association of 
Responsible Enterprises was established. The majority of its members are banks and financial 
institutions that usually do not have trade union representatives among their employees. Thus, 
at national level, there is no consultative body regarding CSR with trade unions’ representation. 
Additionally, the new Labour Code in force since September 2016 does not foresee information 
and consultation function for trade unions if a company sets up a works council. It thereby 
reduces the previous right of trade unions, which were formerly entitled to obtain information 
from the employer and to conduct consultations. According to the Labour Code, the employer 
is obliged to provide information to workers’ representatives concerning the company’s activi-
ties, financial situation and labour relations. Other aspects can be defined in collective agree-
ments or other documents. There is no obligation to consult them on non-financial information, 
but even if there was one, it would not make a big difference as the majority of companies that 
report voluntarily do not have trade union representatives among their employees. This is a 
feature that surely influences the content and quality of non-financial reports.
Mandatory requirements for non-financial information disclosure  
prior to Directive 2014/95/EU
In more than a half of the twelve countries that were the subject of examination in the Di-
masoLab Project, legal requirements regarding the disclosure of non-financial information 
were already in place prior to Directive 2014/95/EU.
A frontrunner with regard to mandatory sustainability reporting is France. Since 1977, French 
law has required companies with more than 300 employees to draw up and submit an annual 
social balance sheet to the works council and from as early as 2003, the 2001 Law on New 
Economic Regulations (NRE) has required listed companies to state in their management re-
port how social and environmental aspects are taken into account in their business operations. 
This law responded, particularly in its Article 116, to the expectation of the French civil society 
for an improvement in the transparency of companies through mandatory annual reporting. 
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Following the implementation, various forms of criticism and proposals for improvement were 
brought forward by civil society stakeholders, including trade unions, as the law only applied to 
companies listed on a regulated market, it exempted SAS (Simplified Joint Stock Companies) 
and failed to specify the scope of application, resulting in some companies only reporting in 
relation to their registered offices. Over the course of time, several changes have been made 
leading to improvements, such as the expansion to unlisted companies that exceeded certain 
thresholds. Companies had to report according to a comprehensive list of topics and indicators 
relating to the three categories (environmental, social and societal), whereby listed companies 
had to provide more information than unlisted ones. It is also remarkable that all companies 
had to request verification of their non-financial information by an independent third-party 
body (ITO). 
In March 2017, prior to the formal transposition of Directive 2014/95/EU, France went much 
further than any European country before in its efforts to scrutinise companies’ efforts to ad-
dress their potential human rights impact. The French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance 
(Law No. 2017-399 of 27 March 2017 on the “Duty of Care of Parent Companies and Ordering 
Companies”) has established a legally binding obligation for parent companies to identify and 
prevent adverse human rights and environmental impacts resulting from their own activities, 
from the activities of the companies they control, and from the activities of their subcontrac-
tors and suppliers with whom they have an established commercial relationship. Companies 
that fall under this law (i.e. companies with (a) more than 5,000 employees working for the 
company and its direct or indirect French-registered subsidiaries, or (b) more than 10,000 em-
ployees working for the company and in its direct or indirect subsidiaries globally) are required 
to develop and enact an annual “vigilance plan” detailing the measures adopted to identify 
risks and prevent serious violations with respect to human rights, health and safety of persons 
and the environment, with such violations potentially resulting from the activity of the com-
pany, its subsidiaries, suppliers and subcontractors. If companies do not comply with the new 
obligation, they may be held liable, with any person with an interest in bringing the case being 
entitled to initiate liability proceedings.
Although CSR has been integrated into legislation for a very long time, there are few public 
studies on non-financial reporting in France, lacking quantitative data and studies providing an 
overview of compliance and impact on corporate behaviour. It is safe to say, however, that in-
volvement in non-financial reporting increases with the size of the company and varies greatly 
depending on the sector. Non-financial reporting is also more likely to exist when the company 
is in a good economic condition and has an international orientation. Non-financial reporting is 
directed primarily towards customers as well as towards investors and rating agencies and is 
associated with quality policy and product differentiation. It is seen as a strategic lever of com-
petitiveness and companies often provide a breakdown assessment of specific performance 
in the different categories. Only few integrate the assessment of all the three categories (i.e. 
environmental, social and societal) and cover the complete list of items that are foreseen. 
Disparities in approaches and reporting practices are not surprising and can be explained by 
differences in the management’s expertise and experience in the field of CSR. The heterogene-
ity of the language used in non-financial reporting and practices clearly illustrates the fact that 
non-financial information is not yet a stabilised concept, both in respect of its perception and 
its mode of integration into companies. Furthermore, there persists a restrictive conception 
of CSR that reduces it to actions with an environmental or social benefit in the interest of the 
company only. To make matters worse, the current economic crisis in France is slowing down 
the development of CSR policies and the improvement of reporting practices. 
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Nevertheless, over the years, the information value relating to the three reporting categories 
has increased, with the social dimension being the best-covered in qualitative terms, which can 
be attributed to the fact that many companies can look back on a lot of experience due to the 
obligation to produce a social balance sheet dating back to 1977. Generally speaking, the qual-
ity of the reports, in particular with regard to the accuracy of the information provided, depends 
on several factors: the size of the company, its reporting experience and its exposure to repu-
tational risks stemming mainly from environmental, societal or major restructuring plans that 
have taken place in the more or less recent past.
Trade unions and associations have been and still are major players in the dissemination of 
CSR knowledge. For example, French trade unions participated in the process of drawing up 
the ISO 26000 reporting standard. In addition, trade unions and NGOs have progressively 
established more cooperation on sustainable development. Several specific initiatives have 
become part of the permanent framework promoting CSR policies and establishing long-term 
dialogue between different stakeholders at national level. This includes the CSR Platform, cre-
ated in June 2013 under the authority of the Prime Minister, stimulating dialogue and consulta-
tions, and bringing together representatives from companies, workers’ representatives, NGOs, 
as well as representatives of public authorities (central administrations, parliamentarians, local 
authorities, etc.). Furthermore, the Citizen Forum on CSR that brings together NGOs, experts 
and trade unions, aiming at constituting a place for exchange of expertise, public expression 
and advocacy on issues related to CSR. Its main objectives are fostering the emergence of a 
national and international framework of CSR, as well as developing a common recourse centre 
for this topic. 
Although there are cooperation processes between union officials and NGOs aiming to support 
the development of CSR and Fair Trade, the problem is that these two stakeholders are rarely 
associated in committees inside companies. Therefore, workers’ representatives are rarely 
involved in the process of identifying the issues taken into account by companies in their re-
ports. Trade union organisations are never consulted prior to the drafting of non-financial re-
ports, though the employer is required to notify the works council of the documents that will be 
sent to shareholders at the annual meeting, on which the works council may submit an opinion. 
Apart from that, there are no further possibilities of involvement. At best, some large compa-
nies present non-financial reports to workers’ representatives, albeit only after their publica-
tion, while the distribution is fairly restricted. 
By decentralising collective bargaining and merging employee representative bodies into one 
Social and Economic Committee (CES) that will replace staff delegates, the works council and 
the Health & Safety Committee in companies with more than 11 employees, President Macron’s 
recent Labour Law reform will certainly have an impact on the social dialogue structure, though 
the exact effects are yet to be seen. 
Another country with a similar long experience in institutionalised sustainability reporting is 
the United Kingdom. Requirements to provide information on non-financial matters have been 
in place since 1978. 
More recent developments have led to the Companies Act 2006, a fundamental revision of 
company law. At the same time, a separate document, the Operation & Finance Review (ORF), 
was introduced for quoted companies, setting out specifications regarding the companies’ 
operations in much greater detail. The intention was that shareholders should have more in-
formation on the impact of a company’s activities on other interests, to enable them to make a 
realistic appraisal and act as enlightened shareholders. The same legislation also implemented 
the EU Accounts Modernisation Directive of 2003 (2003/51/EC), which made non-financial 
reporting a subject of EU law for the first time. 
However, following arguments that the production of the OFR placed too heavy a regulatory 
burden on companies, the regulations were repealed. Instead, non-financial information was 
to be provided in a “Business Review” as part of the directors’ report. The issues covered 
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were similar to those required by the OFR but additional auditing obligations and the statuto-
ry recognition of a reporting standard were removed. Small companies were exempted from 
this obligation. However, quoted companies were required to provide more information on 
environmental matters, the company’s employees and social and community issues, as well as 
the company’s policies in these areas. Where appropriate, KPI relating to environmental and 
employee matters were to be included, although this obligation did not apply to medium-sized 
companies. 
With the intention of improving the clarity and accessibility of the published information, rules 
were again strengthened in 2013 through the Companies Act 2006 Regulations 2013. They 
replaced the requirement to produce a Business Review within the directors’ report with a re-
quirement to present a separate “Strategic Report”, which needed to be specifically approved 
by the board of directors. As with the previous regulations, these rules covered all companies 
other than “small” companies. For most companies, the contents of the Strategic Report were 
the same as those of the Business Review. However, the 2013 Regulations made changes to 
the information that quoted companies had to provide, as they now had to include an additional 
description of the company’s strategy and business, a gender breakdown for directors, senior 
managers and employees, as well as information on human rights issues and the company’s 
policy in this area. Furthermore, the directors’ report was additionally to include information on 
greenhouse gas emission. In a recent paper on corporate governance reform, the government 
has estimated that there are around 900 quoted companies which are required to publish this 
information.
None of these non-financial reporting requirements stipulate the consultation of employee 
representatives in drawing up the reports, not even those explicitly concerning the company’s 
employees. The requirement to provide information internally to employee representatives is 
also very limited. 
In general, there is no universal statutory structure in the UK for informing and consulting 
employees or representatives similar to the works council structure present in a number of 
other EU states. There are different types of representation. The most common (22%) is union 
recognition, where the employer agrees to negotiate with the union or unions represented at 
the workplace. There is also non-union employee representation, which is normally set up by 
the employer, and finally there are joint consultative committees, consisting of employee rep-
resentatives who are entirely union, entirely non-union or a mixture of both. These different 
forms can even coexist at the same workplace. 
There are also a number of regulations which specifically relate to information and consulta-
tion, such as the general framework for informing and consulting employees. However, this 
does not happen automatically. It is normally only implemented if 10% of the workforce request 
it, or the employer decides to do so. Consultations on collective redundancies or health and 
safety are also stipulated by regulations but the UK does not have any formal social dialogue 
structure.
Tripartite consultative bodies, bringing together unions, employers and the government at na-
tional, regional or industry level do not exist. Workers’ representatives, therefore, did not play a 
major role in promoting and developing non-financial reporting. 
In 2007, Sweden became the first country to demand sustainability reports from its 49 state-
owned enterprises. These enterprises were subject to particular guidelines for external report-
ing and had to comply with the GRI reporting standard. According to the guidelines, a sustain-
ability report should include, on the one hand, a clear report of risks and opportunities taking 
into consideration sustainability issues, in particular those non-financial risks and opportuni-
ties that are needed to understand the company’s development, performance and position and, 
on the other hand, a clear report of the stakeholder analysis and stakeholder dialogue with 
a view to identifying and taking a position on significant risks and opportunities, taking into 
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consideration sustainability issues for the company’s most important stakeholders. Moreover, 
the sustainability report was required to be quality assured by independent scrutiny and assur-
ance.
Apart from state-owned companies, Swedish companies have been obliged to publish non-fi-
nancial statements since 2005, pursuant to the Swedish Annual Accounts Act of 1995. The 
Commission Recommendation of 30 May 2001 on the recognition, measurement and disclo-
sure of environmental issues in the annual accounts and annual reports of companies has thus 
been part of Swedish law since well before Directive 2014/95/EU. The government, in fact, as-
sumes that probably all Swedish companies which meet the minimum criteria as stipulated in 
Directive 2014/95/EU already publish some form of sustainability report. A recent survey study 
(2015) indicates that more than 300 large companies in Sweden publish a sustainability report. 
By placing demands on its own enterprises and promoting sustainable initiatives in general, 
the Swedish government aims to inspire all companies to increase their sustainability efforts.
Labour relations in Sweden are characterised by a high level of unionisation (70% in 2014) and 
a high degree of collective agreement coverage (91% in 2014). Trade unions participate in the 
company operations primarily by representation on the board, in health and safety committees 
and co-determination negotiations. 
The trade union movement has been increasingly involved in sustainability issues for the last 
20 years. Most recently, in May 2016, as a result of some form of national social dialogue, also 
with the participation of trade unions, the Swedish (Social-Democratic/Green) government 
presented a strategy for corporate social responsibility which defines the expectations placed 
on companies. Trade unions were involved in the drafting of this strategy. 
By the Co-Determination Act of 1976, before making decisions, the employer has particular ob-
ligations to engage in negotiations with the local trade union with which they have a collective 
agreement in place, which implies that trade unions have a right to be informed and be part of 
negotiations at the planning stage, before a matter is taken to the board for decision. In 1982, 
federations of employers and employees concluded the collective Agreement on Efficiency 
and Participation, supplementing the legislation on co-determination, stating that information 
about and access to the company’s economic situation are two important prerequisites for 
co-operation, influence and development work. With this agreement, trade unions were given 
extensive information and consultation rights regarding a broad spectrum of the company’s 
activities. 
Furthermore, the Act on Private-Sector Employee Representation on the Board of 1987 fore-
sees that employees, i.e. trade unions with a collective agreement with the employer, have a 
right to board-level representation in joint-stock corporations employing more than 25 em-
ployees. Trade unionists on the board, therefore, have the same right to take part in the board’s 
deliberations and to receive information about the company as the board members appointed 
by the owners and, since it is the board that prepares and is responsible for non-financial 
statements, employees are involved at this stage in the drafting of statements by the board. 
As a stakeholder on basically equal footing with the employer’s side, the employee’s side is 
entitled to full disclosure. One can therefore conclude that by means of statutory rules intro-
duced as early as 1976 regarding information and co-operation, local trade unions partake in 
almost every aspect of workplace operations, laying foundations for broad and profound social 
dialogue, regardless of any non-financial report requirements.
In Denmark, about 1,100 of the biggest companies are obliged by the Danish Financial State-
ment Act of 2008 to publish an annual report in which they describe their initiatives related to 
CSR. The 50 biggest among them fall within the scope of Directive 2014/95/EU. 
The companies that are covered by this statutory requirement have to provide information on 
the company’s CSR policies, including any standards, guidelines or principles for CSR which 
they implement. Furthermore, they have to provide information on how the company translates 
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its CSR policies into action, including any systems or procedures applied. Moreover, they have 
to perform an evaluation of what has been achieved through the CSR initiatives during the fi-
nancial year, and any expectations the company has regarding future initiatives. If the company 
has not formulated any CSR policies, this must be reported and explained too.
In June 2012, the Danish parliament adopted an amendment to the Financial Statement Act 
according to which companies now additionally have to expressly account for the topics of 
human rights and the reduction of climate impact, regardless of whether or not these were 
included in the company’s CSR policies. Unfortunately, the regulation only provides guidance 
regarding the different topics that have to be covered and does not refer to a specific reporting 
standard. As a result, companies are free to customise their non-financial reports by adopting 
reporting standards best suited to their reporting means, consequently producing a big variety 
of different types of reports. 
Danish workers’ representatives have not played any role in the process of promoting CSR. 
There is no uniform general opinion on CSR among Danish trade unions. Whereas trade union 
confederations have included CSR in their 3-year strategies, the attitudes towards CSR dif-
fer between the different single trade unions, with some already applying CSR strategies and 
others not seeing any potential in that topic. CSR is still a very new concept to the different 
trade unions, which means that they have not yet figured out how to use its possible potential, 
whereas the confederations are determined to promote CSR in the future. 
Unlike the management’s side, the trade unions do not have any strategic take on non-financial 
reporting as of yet. The topic of CSR has become rather a tool for collaboration and dialogue 
between NGOs and companies and, so far, the trade unions have demonstrated little effort to 
join this dialogue, being more focused on their core task of negotiating collective agreements 
and not paying much attention to CSR matters. 
At company level, the majority of workers’ representatives have little (if any) knowledge with 
regard to CSR or non-financial reports. It is likely that, if asked, they would not even know if 
their company publishes any non-financial reports. Workers’ representatives are therefore 
almost never involved in preparing non-financial reports. If they are involved at all, it is so be-
cause of their role as a board member elected by the employees, though even in such cases, 
the involvement is close to none (1 out of 25 interviewed).
In Belgium, non-financial reporting has been required by statutory law since 2009. The starting 
point of growing awareness of CSR issues was the law of 5 May 1997 on the coordination of 
a federal sustainable development policy. In this law, three concertation networks were iden-
tified: 1. The Belgian Federal Council for Sustainable Development (FRDO-CFDD), an advisory 
board to the federal governments and parliaments, acting on request as well as on its own ini-
tiative, also entrusted with the task of sensitising organisations and citizens on the subject of 
sustainable development. Its members consist of various civil society organisations (e.g., en-
vironmental, development, trade unions, consumers’ unions, federations of employers, etc.); 2. 
The Interdepartmental Commission for Sustainable Development that facilitates negotiations 
between federal civil services and governments, and representatives of the communities and 
regions; and 3. The Federal Planning Bureau, an institute that evaluates the federal policy plans 
and proposes new prospective scenarios through federal reports on sustainable development. 
In addition, there is the Central Economic Council (CEC), a bi-partite body of social dialogue 
on economic matters. The CEC organises the social partners in such a way that the employer 
and employee representative organisations have equal representation. The role of the CEC is to 
inform the government about all questions that relate to the national economy and to provide a 
better insight into the public interest. Therefore, one of the tasks of the CEC is to offer advice 
related to propositions on topics regarding or affecting the national business, either on its own 
initiative or on demand of the legislator. Even though this advice is the result of a compromise 
between employers and employees, it is not legally binding. In addition to this advisory role, 
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the CEC organises meetings with the social partners in order to promote better (informal) di-
alogue between them. These discussions can also lead to independent advice to inform the 
governmental bodies.
In 2006, the federal government established a CSR reference framework and a federal CSR 
action plan with the main objective of stimulating, facilitating and enhancing the quality of 
CSR through governmental actions by mapping federal and regional government initiatives 
regarding CSR and stakeholder’s expectations in relation to governmental support, and by es-
tablishing concrete actions to achieve its principle objective. This CSR framework contained 13 
specific actions for the promotion of CSR, resulting in more and more interest taken in CSR and 
a number of regional initiatives being initiated. 
Finally in 2009, the Corporate Governance Commission published Code 2009, a renewal of the 
Code on Corporate Governance of 2004, aiming at more transparency and containing a num-
ber of principles, provisions and guidelines determining how enterprises should be managed 
and controlled. The application of this code became mandatory for all listed companies, which 
were now required to publish two documents: the Corporate Governance Charter, describing 
the main aspects of its corporate governance, such as its governance  structure,  the  terms  
of  reference  of  the  board  and  its  committees  as  well  as  other  important  topics, and the 
Corporate Governance Statement, including more factual information relating to corporate 
governance: e.g., the provisions which the company does not comply with and the reasons for 
this non-compliance, a remuneration report, a description of the main features of the internal 
control and risk management systems and a description of the composition and operation of 
the board. The arrangements, however, are issue-specific and the law does not constitute a 
generalised regulation. 
In addition, since it is almost an exclusive responsibility of the various regional authorities, leg-
islation regarding environmental matters varies greatly between Flanders, Brussels and Wal-
lonia. All Belgian enterprises, associations, (non-profit) foundations and foreign partnerships 
that are obliged to submit an annual financial report to the National Bank of Belgium must add 
a social balance sheet containing information on the workforce (i.e. the number of employees, 
distribution according to gender, education, type of contract, temporary employees,  employee 
turnover rate, formal and informal on-the-job training, etc.). Therefore, the regulation is more 
efficient when it comes to social and employee-related matters but, other than that, companies 
are left rather free to decide what information will be interesting to their stakeholders.
The Central Balance Sheet Office evaluates social balance sheets for statistical purposes. For 
non-listed companies, there were similar guidelines in the Code Buysse but those could be 
applied on a purely voluntary basis.
Concerning gender equality, since 2015, companies have had to provide a remuneration analy-
sis to the works council as part of the statutorily obligatory economic and financial information 
to account for the wage structure for men and women divided by function, level of education 
and seniority.
Despite the fact that federal as well as regional governments have increasingly adopted CSR 
policies that stimulate or regulate CSR activities of corporate actors, there is currently a lack of 
a universally applied framework, resulting in inconsistent and fragmented non-financial report-
ing. Determining the number of companies that prepare such reports is therefore difficult, even 
if surveys suggest that the number is rather high. 
In order to set an example, the Federal Institute for Sustainable Development was created, and 
in 2011, it released a pilot project introducing the ISO 26000 reporting standard across the 
federal government with the aim of supporting voluntary non-financial reporting, as currently 
the federal government is still not formally obliged to publish an annual financial report or to 
provide a social balance sheet. Subsequently, in 2014, six federal public services were guided 
through the preparation of their non-financial reports based on the GRI G4 reporting standard. 
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Traditionally, trade unions and workers’ representatives are well-supported by Belgian law and 
organised social dialogue is a standard practice. The system of industrial relations and social 
dialogue is characterised by full union participation, recognition and integration, as well as 
legal frameworks, with centralised and strong organisations on both sides. 
The tradition of social dialogue finds its origin in the Social Pact of 1948, having been further 
developed in the collective labour agreement No. 5 on the statute of company representatives, 
which secured the right of employees to be informed and consulted. There exist comprehen-
sive information and consultation rights through the works council and the Committee for 
Prevention and Protection at Work, i.e. the safety committee (CPBW-CPPT). All Belgian com-
panies with more than 100 employees are required to establish a joint works council and com-
panies with more than 50 employees should establish a safety committee. 
The works council is the body that is most strongly involved in receiving and discussing social 
and employment information. Since it is obligatory to inform, consult and present the informa-
tion contained in the annual management report to the works council, the majority of employee 
representatives have the opportunity to read and discuss the report and its content. Interviews 
confirm that, in all cases, workers’ representatives have had the opportunity to read the report, 
that the report has been formally presented and that there has been an exchange between the 
management and trade unions regarding the report. Additionally, the quality of the information 
has been found to be positively related to the size, union strength and “age” of the company. 
Nevertheless, the situation is different when looking at the preparation of the report, where 
workers’ representatives are not involved at all. Thus, involvement in the implementation and 
execution of topics which are the subjects of the annual management report or financial report, 
such as the social balance sheet, does not automatically mean that there is actual collabora-
tion with regard to preparing the annual report.
In the case of Poland, since 2011, companies which fall under the provisions of the Accounting 
Act and thus have to report on their activities have also been obliged to include, if material for 
the assessment of the entity’s position, financial and non-financial indicators. These have to 
be presented together with the information relating to environment and employment matters, 
as well as additional explanations of the amounts presented in their financial statement. In the 
last ten years, the number of non-financial reports has steadily increased and, at present, Pol-
ish companies’ reports make up 26 % of total non-financial reports in Eastern Europe. 
Looking at the concrete figures, however, the number of reporting companies is rather small, 
with a total of just 41 organisations in 2016. The majority of these companies are registered in 
the Register of Reports administered by CSRinfo – a private consulting enterprise, seemingly 
the biggest voluntary register of non-financial reports in Poland. 
In 2009, an important initiative was undertaken at the Warsaw Stock Exchange, whereby an 
index of socially responsible companies was created – the Respect Index. It aims at promoting 
the highest standards of governance in public joint stock companies concerning economic, en-
vironmental and social issues. Companies are selected for inclusion in the Respect Index port-
folio by means of a three-stage procedure where an independent auditor, Deloitte, assesses the 
company’s communication with the market through current and periodical reports and through 
web pages, also looking at how socially responsible the company’s behaviour is with regard to 
the environment, society and workers. 
The year 2016 saw the introduction of an award for the best social report granted by the Min-
istry of Development, while starting from 2017, an annual contest entitled “Social Reports” 
will be organised by the Responsible Business Forum, the largest NGO in Poland dealing the 
CSR-related issued, in partnership with Deloitte. 
The involvement of workers’ representatives’ in CSR issues is absent in Poland for the most 
part. The pivotal institution of industrial relations in Poland is a workplace trade union organi-
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sation. Apart from its monopoly to bargain collectively and to start collective discussions with 
the employer, it has wide competencies to be informed and consulted on various matters relat-
ing to planned collective dismissals, circumstances of a company transfer, health and security 
aspects, etc. 
The extensive power of trade unions in Poland became rather illusory in many companies due 
to the fall in trade union membership numbers, which at present make up no more than 12% of 
all Polish workers. The unionisation level is higher in companies that were set up as a result of 
transformation from previous state-owned enterprises, whereas industrial relations are weak 
in the private sector, where employee representative bodies are almost non-existent. In this 
sector, non-financial reporting is not a tool for developing dialogue between the social partners 
but, most of all, it is a governance strategy aiming at improving the image of the company in 
the eyes of investors and other stakeholders. 
Since 2007, works councils may be set up in companies that employ more than 50 employees, 
providing them with information and consultation rights regarding the company’s activities and 
economic situation. Despite big expectations, the works council structure in Poland is very 
weak and its influence on CSR reporting is not visible. Private companies attach more impor-
tance to direct dialogue with employees than to dialogue or negotiations with employee repre-
sentatives.
At national level, the Social Dialogue Council, a tripartite consultative body, brings together the 
most representative national trade union, employers’ organisations and the government. Trade 
unions exert strong influence on the law-making process through their participation in this 
council. However, the Social Dialogue Council did not deliberate on the future implementation 
of Directive 2014/95/EU. 
Despite legal requirements in Austria, the number of companies reporting on non-financial in-
formation is rather low. Only a quarter of the 100 companies with the highest turnover, the five 
leading banks and the five leading insurance companies publish sustainability reports, whereby 
listed companies perform better than unlisted ones, with 85% of listed companies providing a 
report. 
According to Article 243 (5) of the 2005 Austrian Commercial Code (UGB), large corporations 
were already required to report on key non-financial performance indicators, including infor-
mation about environmental matters and employee matters prior to the implementation of Di-
rective 2014/95/EU. However, the reporting has remained highly inadequate, not least because 
of imprecise requirements. 
Compared with other companies, companies with significant subsidiaries in other countries, 
such as energy suppliers, are more likely to be among those companies that prepare sustaina-
bility reports on a voluntary basis. 
To date, works councils, trade unions and the chambers of labour (collectively: employee or-
ganisations) have not played a significant role in the preparation of sustainability reports. In 
addition to the rights to be informed and consulted, works councils also have co-determination 
rights applying to certain measures (inspection systems that affect human dignity, perfor-
mance-related pay schemes, etc.) which cannot be implemented without the approval of the 
works council. Co-determination also involves the inclusion of employee representatives on 
the supervisory board. 
However, only in exceptional cases are works councils systematically involved in sustainability 
reporting. Generally, involvement tends to occur in companies where there is a traditionally 
strong culture of co-determination, a high degree of unionisation, and public ownership.
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Conclusion
The country studies show that providing non-financial information does not constitute a new 
concept. Legal obligations already existed prior to Directive 2014/95/EU in the majority of the 
countries examined. In all the other countries, companies previously published various kinds 
of non-financial reports on a voluntary basis, whereby large international companies or compa-
nies with international connections were more likely to provide such information.
However, the prevalence of legal obligations with regard to non-financial reporting alone does 
not constitute a sufficient success factor for elaborate reporting. Rather, what becomes clear 
is that comprehensive, comparable and high-quality reporting can only be achieved if there is 
at least one interest group that actively promotes the process of non-financial reporting and 
monitors its implementation. The examples show that these “drivers” can be the state as well 
as union actors. Consequently, one can assume that binding rules and compliance with them 
are most likely to be expected in those cases where both actors shape the process.
Furthermore, the country studies illustrate that in the majority of the cases, the degree of in-
volvement of workers’ representatives in promoting non-financial reporting is rather low. More-
over, it has been shown that strong participation and co-determination rights do not automat-
ically lead to a high rate of involvement of workers’ representatives in non-financial reporting 
at company level. One needs to ask: why do works councils and trade unions keep such a low 
profile with regard to this topic? 
One assumption could be that, in some cases, such as Germany or Sweden, they do not see 
the necessity for more active involvement because they already have extensive information 
and consultation rights which provide sufficient access to non-financial information other than 
through a formal report. On the other hand, examples like Denmark and Italy show that work-
ers’ representatives lack a strategic focus on the subject of non-financial reporting and suffi-
cient knowledge of the reporting criteria and standards as non-financial reports are considered 
more of a management tool solely within the remit of the employer. 
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Law on Social Reporting 
- Companies with more 
than 300 employees have 
to draw up and submit 
an annual social balance 
sheet to the works council
Annual Accounts Act - 
Requires publication of 
non-financial statements 
from 2005 onwards 
Law on New Economic 
Regulations (NRE) 
- Listed companies 
have to report in their 
management report how 
social and environmental 
aspects are taken into 
account in their business 
operations 
Commercial Code 
(UGB) Article 243 (5) 
- Large corporations 
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financial reporting 
required by statutory 
law  2) - Listed 
companies on the 
French stock exchanges 
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Companies that fall 
under the provision of 
the Accounting Act and 
have to report on their 
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Companies Act 2006 
Regulations 2013 
- Intention to make 
the information being 
published clearer and 
more accessible, non-
financial information 
has to be published in 
strategic report
Financial Statement 
Act - Biggest 1,100 
companies are obliged 
by the to publish an 
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initiatives related 
to CSR
Law on National 
Environmental 
Commitment (Grenelle 
Act 2) - Listed companies 
on the French stock 
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on the social and 
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consequences of their 
activities into their 
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French corporate duty 
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Name  Hans-Detlev Küller
Country  Germany
Organisation Arbeit und Leben DGB/VHS NRW e.V.
What is your personal motivation for working on topics 
related to non-financial reporting?
Non-financial information is an excellent opportunity for 
trade unions and works councils to gain a better insight 
into the policies of companies.This will be particularly 
helpful to formulate demands in the social dialogue.
When did you first start working on topics related to 
non-financial reporting?
That was actually quite a long time ago now (laughs). In 
the mid-1970s, trade unions in Germany were confronted 
with the first reports. Those were mostly from companies 
in the chemical sector. They were called social responsi-
bility reports and were rather a matter of PR addressed 
to the general public. However, they also concerned the 
workers, trying to build reputation and an image. There-
fore, the trade unions decided to work on this topic in 
more detail and develop their own positions. After a broad 
discussion, the Confederation of German Trade Unions 
came up with a resolution regarding the content of the 
reports. It was my task to steer the process for the Con-
federation of German Trade Unions at that time.
What has changed since then?
The quality of reporting has improved over the last 30 
years, especially in countries where companies have 
provided these reports since early on. Unfortunately, the 
political debate about developments in this field stopped 
in the 1980s.The focus then shifted more and more to-
wards an environmental perspective. Another change is 
the wording used in the reports. In the beginning, it was 
social responsibility reporting. Now it is called reporting 
on non-financial information, the content is still more or 
less the same though.  
What benefits can trade unions in particular draw from 
non-financial information?
If trade unions and workers representatives are willing to 
deal with these reports, they have a chance to obtain ad-
ditional information on company policy. This can be useful 
for employment and social matters, as the companies now 
have to report on their policies and concepts rather than 
numbers only. With this knowledge, unions are better able 
to develop their own concepts and formulate demands for 
additional information.
60DIMASOLAB  
What is the most remarkable difference in 
your country regarding non-financial report-
ing compared to other European countries?
The main difference stems from the German 
model of co-determination, works councils 
and economic committees. In the past, there 
were already more ways to intervene than in 
other countries and, thus, the benefits are 
now being discussed more critically. The 
other side of the coin is that board members 
and works councils should intervene when 
it comes to the content of non-financial in-
formation reporting. What our research has 
shown though is that, in many cases, trade 
unions and works councils have not yet taken 
too much interest or been very involved in 
these reports. This is mainly because they 
perceive these publications as a matter of 
public relations. If works councils want to ob-
tain additional information, they usually have 
other ways to ask for it and, in most cases, 
they will be provided with the information.
What has been the biggest setback for work-
ing on non-financial information?
At the very beginning of the discussion but 
also later on, I experienced a kind of igno-
rance of the issue. Other topics were per-
ceived as more important and workers rep-
resentatives did not seek an active role. Yet, 
examples show that it is very well possible to 
take an active role in non-financial reporting.
How do you see the future of non-financial 
reporting?
In 2001, France introduced the ‘Law on New 
Economic Regulations’. At one of the expert 
conferences of the DimasoLab Project, Olivier 
Chabrol reported on the situation there since 
the law had been introduced. I expect to see 
a similar development now. The quality of the 
reports will be rather poor at first, particularly 
for those companies that, until now, have nev-
er publish reports on a voluntary basis. Com-
petition will then gradually lead to improve-
ments in quality. If trade unions and works 
councils get involved in this process early on, 
chances are high that the reports will contain 
information that will be useful for them.
What should be the next steps for unions in 
dealing with non-financial reporting?
The implementation process of the directive 
is coming to an end. Now the focus has to be 
within the companies. Many more companies 
have to report at the beginning of next year 
and unions have to be aware that the situation 
has now changed. They have to develop strat-
egies and make recommendations to works 
councils and members of supervisory boards 
on how to deal with this new situation. At the 
beginning of 2018, workers representatives 
have to intervene right away and demand to 
be involved in the process of producing such 
reports. I hope that trade unions will give 
some official recommendations. What we 
know from the DimasoLab Project is that in 
Austria, for example, there already are recom-
mendations and seminars on the content of 
such reports. Their regime of industrial rela-
tions is very similar; consequently, it should 
be possible for Germany too.
What are your political demands for the fur-
ther development of non-financial reporting?
After the debate in the German Parliament, 
there will be no space in the near future to 
discuss improvements in legislation. Never-
theless, one demand should be to increase 
the number of companies covered by the leg-
islation. At present, numerous large private 
companies do not have to report because they 
are not listed or subject to special public sec-
tor law. It should be demanded that reporting 





Name  Henrik Madsen 
Country:  Denmark
Organisation Konventum 
What is your personal motivation for working on topics 
related to non-financial reporting?
I am responsible for the CSR area at my organisation, so I 
am obviously very drawn to anything that is related to this 
field. At the same time, I have a Master’s Degree in Busi-
ness Communication, where I chose to focus on topics of 
CSR and the non-financial aspects of business. I believe 
that, as a stakeholder, companies should fulfil a role that 
is vital to society by engaging in socially and environmen-
tally responsible behaviour.  Non-financial reporting can 
be a way to achieve this (e.g., if you believe the theory of 
Haack & Scherer (2014)).
When did you first start working on topics related  
to non-financial reporting?
During my Master’s Degree, I worked with this kind of re-
porting for the first time.
What has changed since then?
The fact that companies now have to explain why they 
have different policies is a major change. Before, com-
panies were allowed to simply leave out different parts 
with regard to their social responsibility strategy, e.g., if 
they did not have any real policy regarding corruption, the 
environment or diversity in the personnel. Now, with the 
“comply or explain” model, this is not an option anymore. 
A great change.  
What benefits can trade unions in particular draw from 
non-financial information?
I believe that non-financial information can become a key 
to future collective bargaining. In a world that is becoming 
more and more focused around profit and a wider global 
market with fewer boundaries, trade unions will need an 
approach that will appeal to companies as something 
profitable. Non-financial reporting creates a stage where 
companies can strengthen their market position by ex-
cellent reports – and who would be a better consultant on 
issues regarding workforce, healthy work environment, 
health, etc., than trade unions? 
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If trade unions use these reports strategically, 
there will be a possibility to make companies 
promise better conditions in these reports – 
promises they cannot break because all these 
reports are public. While consumers become 
more socially and environmentally aware, 
companies use social and environmental 
responsibility to market themselves and be-
cause of constant information flow from new 
media, companies have to be very strict about 
this. Thus, non-financial reporting is a strong 
tool to create awareness that may promote 
your products. Trade unions can become an 
important partner that can help companies to 
stick to their policies and follow these poli-
cies and/or to consult companies on how to 
create a strong policy.
What is the most remarkable difference 
in your country regarding non-financial 
reporting compared to other European 
countries?
I think that the biggest difference is the scope 
of application requiring all companies with 
more than 250 employees to provide a non-fi-
nancial report. In Denmark, even some rather 
“small” companies need to report, but this is 
of course because Denmark is a small coun-
try. Hence, it makes sense that the threshold 
for reporting obligations will be lower. 
What has been the biggest setback for 
working on non-financial information?
Non-financial reporting is a communicative 
assignment. This means that most companies 
can pay skilled communicators to prepare 
confusing reports that, though they include 
everything they need to, fail to state anything 
too specific. I also have my doubts about how 
these reports will be monitored and whether 
these reports truly reflect the reality. Will the 
reports only be used as a tool for corporate 
greenwashing? This is the big question.   
How do you see the future of 
 non-financial reporting?
I definitely think it is here to stay. The ques-
tion is how we can make the reports reliable 
and trustworthy. I hope that these reports 
become a tool for companies that want to “do 
good” and create strong, responsible pro-
files. As stated earlier, I believe this will be a 
tendency, which is why trade unions should 
see this as a possibility to build a strategic 
position as a collaborative partner to the 
companies. 
What should be the next steps for unions in 
dealing with non-financial reporting?
We need to educate union representatives 
who are linked to companies that are required 
to fulfil non-financial reporting obligations. 
They need to be trained in CSR and under-
stand its origin and the possibilities. We can-
not begin to use the CSR stage strategically if 
we do not understand how the stage is built. 
This is a great challenge because CSR is soft 
law defined by corporations, which can seem 
confusing if you are used to operating in a 
field defined by strict laws and clear rules. 
What are your political demands for the 
further development of non-financial 
reporting?
We need to enhance the scope and quality 
of non-financial reporting. It is important to 
maintain political pressure on how these re-
ports need to be prepared and why they are 
relevant, so that they will not lose their cred-
ibility. Also, members of the public who are 
interested in responsible corporations should 
put a stronger focus on this kind of reporting.
Hence, we need to make sure that as many 
companies as possible will provide non-finan-
cial reports and that the content of these re-
ports is legitimate, respected and fair. We will 
then be able to create a new stage accessible 
by the public to discuss working conditions 
and responsible business behaviour.  
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In this chapter, we summarise the transposition processes in the twelve counties which were 
included in the DimasoLab Project. As a starting point, the transposition process in Belgium is 
introduced in detail. Subsequently, we present and reflect the findings from the other country 
reports in this context.
In Belgium, each governmental actor is responsible for the transposition of those EU Directives 
which fall within their field of competence. At political level, the general monitoring and coor-
dination of this process involving multiple governmental departments is the responsibility of 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs and, at administrative level, this is ensured by the Federal Public 
Service (FPS) Foreign Affairs.
In the case of Directive 2014/95/EU specifically, it was the shared responsibility of the Minis-
ters of Economy, Justice, Finance, and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Jointly with the 
Accounting Standards Commission, a preliminary draft law was formulated and submitted for 
assessment to the bi-partite body of social dialogue on economic matters, namely the Central 
Economic Council (CEC) and the Federal Council for Sustainable Development (FRDO).
Consultation process in Belgium
The CEC organises the social partners in such a way that the representative organisations of 
both the employer and employee each have equal representation. The role of the CEC is to in-
form the government about all questions that relate to the national economy and to provide a 
better insight into the public interest. Therefore, one of the tasks of the CEC is to offer advice 
on propositions related to topics regarding or affecting the national business, either on its own 
initiative or on demand of the legislator. Even though this advice is the result of a compromise 
between employers and employees, it is not legally binding. In addition to this advisory role, 
the CEC organises meetings with the social partners in order to promote better (informal) di-
alogue between them. These discussions can also lead to independent advice to inform the 
governmental bodies.
With the intention of offering unanimous advice, the CEC organised multiple bargaining ses-
sions with both employer and employee representative organisations. Advice was delivered 
to the creators of the draft law. After eventually processing the advice, the Chamber of Repre-
sentatives decided on the law proposal.
As a second party, the Federal Council for Sustainable Development Belgium (FRDO) was also 
asked to hand in its recommendation. The FRDO advises the Belgian federal government on 
federal policy regarding sustainable development. The members of the Council are represent-
atives of various social groups: environmental organisations, organisations for development 
cooperation, employee and employer bodies, youth organisations and the scientific world. Rep-
resentatives of the federal government, the language communities and the regions, environ-
mental councils and economic and social councils are non-voting members. The FRDO eventu-
ally did not succeed in expressing any advice because of a lack of consensus. This was partly 
caused by the position of the Association of Belgian Companies, the only inter-professional 
employers’ organisation that represents companies of the three Belgian regions. From the on-
set, they stated that they would be unable to agree on a consensus within the FRDO because 
their standpoints were too different from those of the NGOs and environmental organisations. 
This was part of a strategy to limit the implementation obligations to the bare minimum; an 
agreement within the CEC was more feasible. 
As a result, the social partners were the only parties to issue advice, even though they were not 
the only ones asked to do so.
There were additional attempts by unions to add obligations regarding the inclusion of information.
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Recommendations by the Central Economic Council
In general, the unanimous advice of the CEC concurred with the draft law. However, the Council 
formulated a couple of remarks. Some of them only pointed to ambiguities in the legislative 
situation that would result from combining this draft law with previous legislation, while other 
remarks concerned the actual content of the draft law.
Firstly, the CEC pointed out that state-owned enterprises with a commercial, financial or eco-
nomic task in general have to fulfil an exemplary role. Therefore, this role should also extend 
to corporate social responsibility and sustainable development. Consequently, the CEC advised 
the development of legislation concerning these organisations in the near future. This legisla-
tion should set out similar requirements to those for listed firms, which could even be achieved 
by broadening the current draft law.
Secondly, the CEC addressed the possibility given by the EU Directive to either publish the 
non-financial information separately or integrated into the annual report. Here, the Council 
stressed that the separate report should be subject to the same conditions as the integrated 
reporting. According to Article 17 of the Royal Decree of 27 November 1973, the annual report 
is part of the information that must be provided to the works council on an annual basis. When 
the report on non-financial information is part of the annual report, it is thus automatically 
presented to the works council. This should also be the case with a separate report containing 
non-financial information. Therefore, the CEC asked for this to be included in the explanatory 
note on the draft law. In broader terms, the CEC asked for a statement to be included in the 
draft law that would ensure that the Royal Decree of 1973 would not be voided.
Thirdly, regarding the reporting standards companies can use for their reporting on non-fi-
nancial information, the CEC asked for companies to be given the possibility of using multiple 
reporting standards, whereas the draft law only provided for one reporting standard per report. 
Also, the CEC asked to be consulted regarding the list of reporting standards provided by the 
Minister of Economic Affairs. The CEC openly published the advice online.
Further demands from unions
In addition, trade unions demanded that the publication of the information on subcontractors 
and the supply chain of companies ought to be a compulsory component of the report. They in-
sisted that including this information would be crucial because a major part of the environment 
and social impact of companies depends on these partnerships. Omitting this information 
could result in reports on non-financial information being incomplete or even misleading. 
Also, a plea was made to include stricter rules for the auditor, going beyond only a certificate 
on the release of the necessary information. Rather, audits should also include a check on 
whether the information is quantitatively and qualitatively correct and consistent with the an-
nual account numbers. Otherwise, the trade unions anticipated reports on non-financial infor-
mation of dubious quality. At the same time, trade unionists recognised that this might be diffi-
cult in practice. A similar obligation regarding the numbers on the social balance sheet already 
existed but auditors rarely checked these numbers because it was found to be too difficult. 
This would likely be the case with reports on non-financial information as well.
Outcome of the transposition process
On 11 September 2017, the Belgian Official Gazette published the new law “Wet betreffende 
de bekendmaking van niet-financiële informatie en informatie inzake diversiteit door bep-
aalde grote vennootschappen en groepen” or “Loi relative à la publication d’informations non 
financières et d’informations relatives à la diversité par certaines grandes sociétés et certains 
groupes” of 3 September 2017. 
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The final law does not contain many differences in comparison with the previously discussed 
law proposal. It requires reports on non-financial information to be added to the annual man-
agement reports and those are collected by the National Bank of Belgium. They are then 
published and therefore publicly consultable. It allows for the report on non-financial informa-
tion to either be a separate report or a part of the annual management report. Whenever it is 
published as a separate report, companies are obliged to disclose the report on non-financial 
information to the works council and shareholders as a part of the economic and financial in-
formation they receive by law. Thus, demands of trade unions have been met and all immediate 
stakeholders involved will have sufficient access to the information. Companies covered by the 
law are now more clearly defined, though the final law still sets out the same minimum scope 
as the EU Directive. 
Regarding the conditions of reporting on non-financial information or sanctions on non-com-
pliance, nothing has changed in comparison to the proposal. The law did not meet demands 
for additional obligations regarding the inclusion of information on, e.g., subcontractors and 
the supply chain of companies either. In terms of obligatory auditing, the final law goes beyond 
the minimum required by the EU Directive as it states that the auditor has to check whether the 
information in the NFI reports is ‘in accordance with’ the information given in the annual man-
agement report.
Nevertheless, employee representatives at the board meeting of the CEC pointed out that 
the original advice of the CEC included a passage on the responsibility and exemplary role of 
governmental organisations with a commercial, financial or economic task, among others, re-
garding the promotion of corporate social responsibility. Therefore, the CEC proposed that the 
regulation on non-financial information reporting should be developed in line with the direc-
tives for other companies. This way, they asked for an enlargement of the scope of the law – a 
demand that has not been met thus far. In fact, the introduced law does not discuss this matter 
at all. Employee representatives are therefore continuing to put emphasis on this part of the 
advice. Employer representatives have carefully agreed, under the condition that this is in ac-
cordance with the original passage, and formulated some additional remarks. This implies that 
the discussion on this topic is not yet closed: the CEC has started an initiative to contact the 
ministry. However, this issue would be the responsibility of each regional government individu-
ally; it cannot be a national decision.
The Belgian case is good as a reference of a clear structure for the transposition process. 
This is mainly due to the existing bodies and distinct competencies in consultation processes 
reflecting the tradition of the country’s social dialogue. This is not the case with most of the 
other countries involved in the DimasoLab Project, where either such bodies or competencies 
are not as clearly defined or, though they do exist, they were not involved in the process for 
some reason,  be it a lack of integration or interest. In this regard, only the French case is on a 
par with the Belgian example, though it displays a much higher level of complexity due to the 
previously existing national law. In the following sections, we will take a closer look at the par-
ticularities of the consultation, the recommendations by social partners and outcomes. We will 
then proceed to discuss conclusions and outline the criticism raised in the different countries.  
Consultation with Social Partners
Amendments were made without any consultations with trade unions in Lithuania. Even in the 
explanatory report, which is attached to the project of amendments, trade unions were not 
listed among the institutions approached in the consultation process. The only consultations 
conducted were those with some ministries and employers’ organisations. The Government 
did not expand the application of the provisions to other enterprises beyond those covered by 
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the Directive. Lithuanian trade unions were not informed about the preparation to transpose 
the provisions of the EU Directive and were not invited to participate and give comments on the 
draft of the amendments to the law.
The legislative process regarding the EU Directive in Sweden was entirely void of conceptual-
isations of immediate worker interest in this matter. Instead, the discussion was solely geared 
towards actors such as investors, clients and consumers. Labour law, which is otherwise such 
a prominent phenomenon, was absent from the debate about companies’ disclosure of non-fi-
nancial information. The legislator seems to have subscribed to a strict line of demarcation 
between classic labour law and corporate law/accounting law. The Swedish law and society 
therefore perceived the EU Directive as far removed from labour law and trade unions.
The blue-collar trade union federation LO argued that the minimum application threshold stip-
ulated in the EU Directive (500 employees) was not adequate and, instead, suggested a limit 
of 250 employees with an eye to a future revision of the national law/directive to include even 
more companies. Furthermore, LO regrets that labour issues (as put forward in the 7th pre-
amble to the EU Directive) are given no prominence and asked that the EU Directive be further 
linked to industrial relations and the organisations on the labour market at state level. Also, the 
white-collar trade union federation TCO put forward the same comments as LO.
Formal consultation in the United Kingdom ran for eight weeks. The government published a 
47-page consultation document, including a questionnaire comprising 19 questions. It set out 
options for implementing the EU Directive and put forward a number of other changes to com-
pany reporting which the government was considering, calling on interested parties to respond.
The consultation document presented a generally positive assessment of the EU Directive, 
arguing that it “broadly reflected the UK narrative reporting framework introduced in October 
2013”. However, the key question was how to address the differences between the non-fi-
nancial reporting requirements in the EU Directive and those in the existing UK legislation, in 
particular, whether the EU requirements should be extended to all quoted companies, or only 
limited to those directly affected.
In addition to receiving submissions, government officials also met with a number of interested 
parties, including the Trade Union Congress (TUC), which is the UK union confederation.
After the closure of the consultation, the government published an impact assessment looking 
at the financial costs of the measure and its response to the consultation procedure.  
As well as setting out the government’s future policy for implementing the EU Directive, the 
document summarised the responses to its proposals that the government had received. In 
total, 76 responses were received including 21 from representative bodies, of which only one 
was from a trade union body, the TUC.
In its response, the TUC urged the government “to implement the EU Directive in a way that 
strengthened, rather than watered down, existing UK non-financial reporting requirements”, 
and, in particular, argued against narrowing the scope of non-financial reporting requirements.
In relation to other issues raised in the consultation document, the TUC response also argued 
against “removing the requirement for companies to report on their policies on the employ-
ment of disabled persons”. Furthermore, it reasoned that the current requirement to report on 
the number of men and women in senior management within the company should be main-
tained, in order to support the aim of achieving greater female representation on company 
boards and at senior levels. Lastly, it advocated for the establishment of a central access point 
open to the public, for those who wish to access the company reports.  
The implementation of the EU Directive in the Netherlands passed through a two-stage le-
gal track. The government integrated the reporting obligation into the Civil Code through an 
amendment of this Code, effectively reducing the process to a mere formality, which was con-
sidered a politically insensitive move. This is because this way no direct involvement of social 
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partner organisations was invited at this stage. The concretisation of the different provisions 
of the Directive was formulated in a ‘general decision of public order’ and the government ini-
tiated a consultation on the possible content of this decision, based on a document in the form 
of a draft regulation. The Decision, a general administrative regulation, was formulated, cir-
culated and discussed in Parliament. During this process, the draft Decision was discussed in 
the Social Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad – SER) as part of a broader revision 
of the corporate governance code under preparation. The Council is a platform for negotiating 
corporate governance agreements. This tripartite approach is a crucial aspect of the Dutch 
governance culture. There were no separate consultations of the social partners outside of this 
frame.
The public consultation that was organised by the government attracted only 16 replies. The 
trade unions did not react directly. However, the training fund for works councils, an organisa-
tion associated to the trade unions, participated in the online public consultation.
The training fund was of the opinion that the point of view of one important stakeholder was 
missing in the proposals, namely the position of the works council. Reference was made to 
the extensive information, consultation and advisory right of works councils. According to 
the fund, the content of the reporting should be discussed and, if appropriate, agreed with the 
works council before being published.
In Spain, an inter‐ministerial group was formed to prepare a proposal for the transposition. A 
draft proposal was developed by the Institute of Accounting and Audit of Accounts (Ministry of 
Economy, Industry and Competition). As mentioned in Chapter 1, in Spain, there is an advisory 
and consultative body composed of Administration and Social Agents called CERSE – the CSR 
Council. Even though one of their duties is to inform about the 12 public regulations on CSR, 
the transposition of the EU Directive was not addressed due to a political decision. 
Once completed, the proposal was open to public consultation for ten days. CCOO made a pro-
posal for modification, in order to include some changes in the text. In the next step, the final 
proposal of the law was sent to the Spanish Parliament for discussion and for the final text to 
be approved. This stage presented a chance to include opinions and proposals through dia-
logue with political parties. The expectation that this particular process would result in a good 
regulation was very low.
The following proposals for amendments to the draft text were made by CCOO in relation to the 
transposition of the EU Directive: an advanced definition of employee matters, obligatory in-
volvement of workers representatives in the preparation of statements on non-financial infor-
mation in the form of a trade union report, a relevance check focused on real social and labour 
impact, a national definition of Key Performance Indicators, obligatory non-financial informa-
tion about the situation in the supply chain. In addition, in the opinion of CCOO, separate re-
porting by daughter companies was not found to be necessary if the labour force was consid-
ered in the consolidated report of the mother company. Furthermore state-owned enterprises 
and large private companies should be covered, obligatory checks of reports on non-financial 
information by a statutory auditor or audit firm should be conducted. Most importantly though, 
there should be a trade union report in order to validate the given information, with statements 
on diversity and consumer matters also made obligatory.
For the transposition into Italian law, the Government in Italy opted for a two-staged online 
public consultation. The Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance, in collaboration with the Min-
istry of Economic Development, launched the first online public consultation lasting one month 
with the aim of obtaining evaluation, feedback and suggestions from stakeholders regarding 
the basic choices of the law. The first public consultation saw a total of 35 subjects, 3 of whom 
were unions (CGIL, CISL, UIL) and 8 – employers’ organisations (ABI, AIAF, ANIA, ASSIREVI, 
ASSONIME, CONFINDUSTRIA, UTILITALIA, CSR Manager Network). 
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The first consultation contained 26 questions which could be grouped into 6 main areas. 
The first area was generally aimed at understanding the extent to which the disclosure of 
non-financial information by companies could be a key factor in the decisions taken by stake-
holders, based on the contents of the EU Directive and previous experience of non-financial 
reporting.
The second area concerned the enforcement of the EU Directive and whether the minimum 
requirements should be applied or extended to other types of companies.
The third area related to the reference standards for the identification and accountability of the 
indicators. The fourth area was centred around whether companies that already reported on 
non-financial parameters in an extra report should be allowed to keep this information sepa-
rate from the financial statements.
The fifth issue was about the policy of diversity with regard to corporate governance, though 
only related to those organisations which had admitted to trading their securities on a regulat-
ed market in a member state.
The last area of the consultation concerned the assessment of non-financial information and 
whether only the submission of the declaration of non-financial nature or also third-party as-
sessment should be mandatory.
The mediation work was particularly intense, considering that the parties involved had ex-
pressed very divergent positions on many questions. Taking into account the comments, the 
Department drew up a draft of the legislative decree.
The draft of the legislative decree (law) was submitted to the subjects and stakeholders for 
assessment, in order to obtain comments and proposals for amendments. Then, a second 
consultation was conducted, again, in the form of an online public consultation. In total, 32 
subjects were involved in the second consultation, of which three were unions (CGIL, CISL, UIL) 
and seven (ABI, AIAF, ANIA, ASSIREVI, ASSONIME, CONFINDUSTRIA, UTILITALIA, CSR Manag-
er Network) were employers’ organisations. The three unions presented a common document. 
The main choices of the second public consultation were focused around the scope of applica-
tion of the legislative decree, the standards and methodology, as well as the compliance of the 
information provided.
Following this, the Council of Ministers approved the Legislative Decree implementing the EU 
Directive in preliminary examination. 
The draft of the Legislative Decree passed the examination of the relevant committees. The 
Parliamentary Committees for Justice and Finance of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Sen-
ate expressed their opinion on the draft of the Legislative Decree. 
The discussion between the political forces was broad and articulated. The Senate was much 
more receptive to the request to broaden the target group of the decree: including public util-
ity companies, companies that receive public funding or participate in government’s tenders, 
as well as those which have a relevant impact on society and on the environment. In addition, 
the Senate had suggested adopting a single standard of reporting that would be best suited to 
facilitate comparisons between the data presented by different companies obliged to prepare 
non-financial reporting. Finally, the government was invited to adopt a reward mechanism for 
SMEs that voluntarily decide to submit their non-financial reports.
After receiving the opinions, the government thus approved the final text of the decree.
The three trade union organisations (Cgil, Cisl and Uil) were unanimous in their criticism of the 
fact that the Italian law did not limit the use of autonomous methodology. In order to ensure 
the uniformity and comparability of the information, it would be important to use international-
ly and nationally recognised reference standards. Also, the Italian law provides for the possibil-
ity to not publish information which may harm the commercial policy of the undertaking. Lastly, 
the foreseen sanctions in case of non-publication of the report on non-financial information 
were criticised as being too modest.
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In Austria, key stakeholders were asked to put forward their views during a public consultation. 
The chambers of labour and trade unions raised the following points: The scope of the Act 
should be extended to also include ‘public interest corporations’ as defined by the criteria for 
large corporations pursuant to the Austrian Commercial Code (UGB). In addition, the scope of 
the Act should be extended to large companies that are majority-owned by the Austrian fed-
eration, and to extra-large companies pursuant to the Austrian Commercial Code (“XL compa-
nies”) that are not listed on the stock exchange. 
Finally, the employee organisations called for it to be made mandatory for the NFI statement to 
be audited externally to ensure that the statement on non-financial information acquires sim-
ilar significance to that of financial reporting, and that the information presented in the state-
ment played a role in shaping the management of the given company.
Most NGOs argued along similar lines to those of the employee organisations. 22 organisa-
tions participated in the public consultation. Of those, for example, sixteen called for manda-
tory Key Performance Indicators. However, only very limited consideration was given to those 
demands when transposing the EU Directive into national law.
Imprecision with respect to the content that needs to be reported was singled out for criticism 
as the greatest weakness of the EU Directive. The unclear phrasing was adopted almost word 
for word in the Draft Act. At the urging of the employee organisations and NGOs, in the com-
mentary on the Act, the Comprehensive Option of the GRI G4 Guidelines, in accordance with 
the materiality analysis specified therein, was defined as a “safe harbour”, which was a minor 
achievement. In addition, on the initiative of the employee organisations, employee matters 
were specified as follows:  “With respect to social and employee matters, the statement should 
contain information on measures taken to ensure equality with respect to gender, origin and 
religion, on implementation of the fundamental conventions of the International Labour Organ-
isation, on working conditions, on social dialogue, especially with employee organisations, on 
respect for the right of employees to be informed and consulted, on respect for the rights of 
the trade unions, on occupational health and safety, on training and professional development, 
on workforce trends in the categories of contract types, working hours, employee turnover and 
income trends, on dialogue with local communities and on action taken to ensure the protec-
tion and development of such communities, unless the company declares that it does not have 
a policy on such matters and provides relevant justification.”
An inter-ministerial group was formed to prepare a proposal for the transposition in Germany. 
A draft proposal was developed by the Institute of Accounting and Audit of Accounts (Ministry 
of Economy, Industry and Competition). 
The transposition of the EU Directive was not discussed in the CSR Forum introduced in Chap-
ter 1, which is supposed to advise the Federal Government on further developing the national 
CSR strategy and drawing up recommendations on individual topics. Whether some civil organ-
isations or trade unions asked for a debate within the CSR Forum regarding the transposition 
is unknown. The last meeting of the National CSR Forum was held on 29 January 2015, even 
though it is usually scheduled to meet twice a year. 
The procedure of preparing the transposition law started with a concept paper of the Ministry 
of Justice, followed by the first consultation of stakeholders. 
37 organisations took part in the consultations held by the ministry, including the German 
Confederation of Trade Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund – DGB) and 17 employer organ-
isations. The written contributions of all organisations are documented on the website of the 
Ministry.
In the consultations as well as the later debate in the Bundestag, NGOs and the DGB articulated 
criticism of the government’s approach of doing very little in the way of exercising the national 
options.
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In the two consultations of the Ministry of Justice and after the Cabinet of Ministers had is-
sued their decision, the DGB delivered written statements explaining the approach taken by 
trade unions regarding the transposition of the EU Directive into national law. They were in fa-
vour of including the statement on non-financial information into the annual management re-
port and against allowing it to be a separate report. Also, what was demanded was that a legal 
obligation to publish non-financial information be placed on both the largest private enterpris-
es and all companies with more than 250 employees. According to the DGB, the definition of 
relevance in the transposition law was too restrictive and needed to be modified. Furthermore, 
they believed that the law should be amended to make it obligatory for worker representatives 
to be involved in the preparation of statements on non-financial information. They also called 
for the reporting regarding the situation in the supply chain to be improved. Regarding the 
reporting standards, the DGB favoured the German Sustainability Code (Deutscher Nachhaltig-
keitskodex – DNK) and they wished for consumer matters to be an obligatory topic. The DGB 
was also against the solution regarding the reporting on non-financial information in daughter 
companies and the opt-out clause given by an individual provision in the German Commercial 
Code. Regarding the auditing of statements on non-financial information, the DGB demanded a 
check by an auditor.
There was no formal consultation process regarding the transposition of the EU Directive in 
Denmark. No official positions of trade unions on the implementation of the EU Directive were 
published. Still, there were some demands which are worth mentioning. These include: a more 
specific definition of employee matters, obligatory involvement of workers’ representatives 
in the preparation of statements on non-financial information, a real solution to wider agree-
ments on the national definition of Key Performance Indicators, non-financial information 
about the situation in the supply chain as an important statement that should be obligatory, the 
opt-out clause as an unsatisfactory solution. Reporting should also be obligatory in daughter 
companies, or at least a clear reference to the main company’s report should be provided. Fur-
thermore, a check of non-financial information by a statutory auditor or audit firm should be 
obligatory. 
A proposal was prepared by the Ministry of Finance in Poland and, following a procedure of 
pre-consultations and consultations, it was submitted to Parliament. The central-level Polish 
trade union federations and confederations (NSZZ Solidarność, OPZZ and Forum Związków 
Zawodowych) took part in the consultations but none of them presented a statement. The im-
plementation proposal was not discussed at the Social Dialogue Council.
In France, a proposal to amend the current law was launched through comments by the Min-
istry of the Economy and Finance. Prior to this proposal, discussions on a number of issues 
took place between the public authorities, including: the National Platform for Global Action 
for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR Platform), the Citizens’ Forum for CSR, the Forum for 
Responsible Investment (FIR, FrenchSif) and several trade union confederations including the 
CFDT.
During the consultation, the CSR Platform, whose members include the main trade union or-
ganisations (CFDT, CGT, FO, CGC-CFE, Unsa), and the Citizen Forum on CSR (on which the CFDT 
and CGT are also represented) made several joint requests:
»» the application of the new legislation to listed and unlisted companies 
»» (same categories of information to be provided);
»»  appropriate sectoral indicators, i.e. adapted to the situation in each sector and 
adjustment of the already obligatory list of items 
»» extending the scope of reporting to subsidiaries, country by country;
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For trade union organisations and the majority of stakeholders, a consolidated report prepared 
by a parent entity does not allow sufficient analysis of the various activities, especially in the 
case of diversified companies. The question of the treatment of subsidiaries should not be 
considered from the point of view of thresholds, but rather, according to the differences in the 
nature of activities within the parent enterprise. Consolidation, which mixes activities of dif-
ferent types and geographical locations, does not allow for reliable use of the data. For groups 
with diversified activities, the parent company’s consolidated report should show the CSR data 
of each subsidiary in each country. It was the trade union organisations that put particular em-
phasis on this point.
Furthermore, specific demands from certain trade union organisations were articulated, of 
which two examples highlight the specificities of the transposition process in France. The 
CFDT proposed a reference to “loyalty of practice” in addition to information on actions taken 
to prevent corruption. For this trade union centre, it was also desirable for the reports to in-
clude information on the main lobbying activities, donations or payments to political parties 
or politicians in countries where they were legally authorised. Also, they wanted the following 
information to be provided country by country: the name of each establishment, nature of busi-
ness, turnover, number of employees, profit or loss before taxes, income taxes and government 
subsidies received.
The CFDT also posed the question of the extent and limits of the tasks assigned to the Independ-
ent Third Party Organisation (ITO) in terms of control. This issue was insufficiently discussed by 
the stakeholders of the CSR Platform during the consultation. However, it was completely under-
standable that the question of the independence of a structure entirely financed by the private 
sector was raised. Part of the control could reasonably be assumed by a stakeholder committee. 
The ITO is able to monitor the disclosure of non-financial information and ensure legal compli-
ance, but stakeholders, especially employee representatives, are most suitable to perform the 
resulting risk analysis and assess the relevance of the information provided.
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Austria • over 500 employees
• net turnover over EUR 40 million or balance sheet total over 20 million
• public interest entities:* 
-  capital marked oriented enterprises
•  a description of the undertaking's business 
model
• company policies relating to non-financial 
matters and the ourcomes of those policies
• principal risks related to non-financial 
matters and business activities 
• any non-financial KPIs which are used
may rely upon an 
international, national 
or EU based reporting 
framework
within the annual report or as separate report 
published with the management report
yes yes presence of statement
Belgium • over 500 employees
• net turnover over EUR 34 million or balance sheet total over 17 million
• public interest entities:
-  settlement organisations
likewise within the management report or as separate report 
with reference made to management report
yes yes presence of statement
Denmark • over 250 employees
• net turnover over DRK 313 (EUR 42) million or balance sheet total over  
DRK 156 (EUR 20 million)
• Undertakings of accounting class D:
- Listed companies 
- State-limited liability companies
likewise likewise  
 
with reference to 
UNGC COP, PRI or GRI 
within the annual or management report or as 
separate report published on the website of the 
enterprise, for a period of 5 years, with a reference in 
the management report
yes does not apply presence of statement 
and consistency check of 
disclosures as part of the 
review of the management 
report
France • over 500 employees
• net turnover over EUR 40 million or balance sheet total over 20 million
• additionally required to report:
-  non-listed sociétés anonymes and non-listed investment funds with net turnover 
over EUR 100 million
likewise likewise within the annual report within 8 months of the end 
of the financial year and made available on website 
for 5 years
yes yes presence of statement and 
content required if company 
has 500+ employees and a 
turnover over EUR 100 million 
or balance sheet over EUR 100 
million
Germany • over 500 employees
• net turnover over EUR 40 million or balance sheet total over 20 million
• public interest entities:
-  capital marked oriented companies in the  legal form of a limited liability company 
or cooperative 
 
likewise likewise within the management report or a separate non-
financial report, within 4 months after the balance 
sheet date made available for 10 years on company 
website or central register for annual management 
reports (www.bundesanzeiger.de)
yes yes no mandatory verification, 
but if the report is verfied by 
an auditor or an independent 
assurance services provider, 
the audit report has to be 
published
Italy • over 500 employees
• net turnover over EUR 40 million or balance sheet total over 20 million
likewise likewise 
 
or a mixed reporting  
methodology 
constituted by one or 
more
within the management report or a separate report, 
approved by the approved by the administrative 
body and at disposal of the supervisory body and 
the auditor, within the deadline for the financial 
statements, published on the company register and 
alongside the management report
yes yes presence and content of 
statement
Lithuania • over 500 employees
• net turnover over EUR 40 million or balance sheet total over 20 million
• public interest entities:
- pension funds, 
-  state and/or municipality owned large public or private limited liability 
companies,listed companies
-  investment undertakings,
-  Central Securities Depository and Vilnius Securities Exchange
-  brokerage firms
-  management companies
likewise  
 
additionally: explanation of the sums 
indicated in the financial statement 
which are relevant to corporate social 
responsibility
likewise within the annual report or a separate report 
published within 3 months of the last day of the 
financial year and made available on the company 
website and referenced in the annual report
yes yes presence of statement
Netherlands • over 500 employees
• net turnover over EUR 40 million or balance sheet total over 20 million 
 
likewise likewise within the annual management report yes yes presence of statement
Poland • over 500 employees
• net turnover over PLN 170 (EUR 40) million or balance sheet total over PLN 85 (EUR 20) 
million
•  public interest entities:
- pension funds 
- national payment institutions 
- electronic money institutions 
-  entities intending or pending for admission to one of the EOG regulated markets
likewise likewise within the management report or a separate report 
published alongside the management report within 
6 months of the balance sheet date, made available 
on the undertaking's website and referrenced in the 
management report
yes yes presence of statement
Spain • over 500 employees
• net turnover over EUR 40 million or balance sheet total over 20 million
•  public interest entities:
- Payment and electronic money institutions 
-  Pension funds which, during two consecutive years, at the closing 
date of each year, have at least 10,000 participants 
-  Investment services and collective investment institutions, which 
has 5,000+ clients or 5,000+ shareholders
• entities who, during two consecutive years, at the closing date of each year,  
have a net turnover over EUR 2 billion, and over 4,000 employees
likewise  
 
additionally: explanation of the sums 
indicated in the financial statement 





EMAS, UNGC, UNGP, 
OECD, ISO 26000, ILO 
Declaration or GRI
within the management report or a separate report 
published alongside the managemnet report, or 
a consolidated management report (provided the 
company scope criteria are exceeded 2 years in a 
row)
yes yes presence of statement
Sweden • over 250 employees 
net turnover over SEK 350 (EUR 35) million or balance sheet total over SEK 175 (EUR 
17 million) 
 
reporting obligation applies to all types of companies that fulfill at least two of the 
criteria regarding turnover, assets or number of employees, and is not limited to PIEs
likewise  
 
additionally an explanation of the sums 
indicated in the financial statement 
which are relevant to corporate social 
responsibility
likewise within the annual report or a separate sustainability 
report published alongside the annual report
yes yes presence of statement
United Kingdom over 500 employees likewise likewise within the strategic report yes yes presence and content of 
statement
*  In all countries except Denmark, the reporting requirement applies to public interest entities, i.e. listed companies, credit institutions and insurance undertakings. The table only contains additional national definitions for 
public interest entities as well as entities that are additionally required to report.   
    additional source:  
CSR Europe and GRI: Member State Implementation of Directive 2014/95/EU - A comprehensive overview of how Member States are implementing the EU Directive on Non-financial and Diversity Information
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Austria • over 500 employees
• net turnover over EUR 40 million or balance sheet total over 20 million
• public interest entities:* 
-  capital marked oriented enterprises
•  a description of the undertaking's business 
model
• company policies relating to non-financial 
matters and the ourcomes of those policies
• principal risks related to non-financial 
matters and business activities 
• any non-financial KPIs which are used
may rely upon an 
international, national 
or EU based reporting 
framework
within the annual report or as separate report 
published with the management report
yes yes presence of statement
Belgium • over 500 employees
• net turnover over EUR 34 million or balance sheet total over 17 million
• public interest entities:
-  settlement organisations
likewise within the management report or as separate report 
with reference made to management report
yes yes presence of statement
Denmark • over 250 employees
• net turnover over DRK 313 (EUR 42) million or balance sheet total over  
DRK 156 (EUR 20 million)
• Undertakings of accounting class D:
- Listed companies 
- State-limited liability companies
likewise likewise  
 
with reference to 
UNGC COP, PRI or GRI 
within the annual or management report or as 
separate report published on the website of the 
enterprise, for a period of 5 years, with a reference in 
the management report
yes does not apply presence of statement 
and consistency check of 
disclosures as part of the 
review of the management 
report
France • over 500 employees
• net turnover over EUR 40 million or balance sheet total over 20 million
• additionally required to report:
-  non-listed sociétés anonymes and non-listed investment funds with net turnover 
over EUR 100 million
likewise likewise within the annual report within 8 months of the end 
of the financial year and made available on website 
for 5 years
yes yes presence of statement and 
content required if company 
has 500+ employees and a 
turnover over EUR 100 million 
or balance sheet over EUR 100 
million
Germany • over 500 employees
• net turnover over EUR 40 million or balance sheet total over 20 million
• public interest entities:
-  capital marked oriented companies in the  legal form of a limited liability company 
or cooperative 
 
likewise likewise within the management report or a separate non-
financial report, within 4 months after the balance 
sheet date made available for 10 years on company 
website or central register for annual management 
reports (www.bundesanzeiger.de)
yes yes no mandatory verification, 
but if the report is verfied by 
an auditor or an independent 
assurance services provider, 
the audit report has to be 
published
Italy • over 500 employees
• net turnover over EUR 40 million or balance sheet total over 20 million
likewise likewise 
 
or a mixed reporting  
methodology 
constituted by one or 
more
within the management report or a separate report, 
approved by the approved by the administrative 
body and at disposal of the supervisory body and 
the auditor, within the deadline for the financial 
statements, published on the company register and 
alongside the management report
yes yes presence and content of 
statement
Lithuania • over 500 employees
• net turnover over EUR 40 million or balance sheet total over 20 million
• public interest entities:
- pension funds, 
-  state and/or municipality owned large public or private limited liability 
companies,listed companies
-  investment undertakings,
-  Central Securities Depository and Vilnius Securities Exchange
-  brokerage firms
-  management companies
likewise  
 
additionally: explanation of the sums 
indicated in the financial statement 
which are relevant to corporate social 
responsibility
likewise within the annual report or a separate report 
published within 3 months of the last day of the 
financial year and made available on the company 
website and referenced in the annual report
yes yes presence of statement
Netherlands • over 500 employees
• net turnover over EUR 40 million or balance sheet total over 20 million 
 
likewise likewise within the annual management report yes yes presence of statement
Poland • over 500 employees
• net turnover over PLN 170 (EUR 40) million or balance sheet total over PLN 85 (EUR 20) 
million
•  public interest entities:
- pension funds 
- national payment institutions 
- electronic money institutions 
-  entities intending or pending for admission to one of the EOG regulated markets
likewise likewise within the management report or a separate report 
published alongside the management report within 
6 months of the balance sheet date, made available 
on the undertaking's website and referrenced in the 
management report
yes yes presence of statement
Spain • over 500 employees
• net turnover over EUR 40 million or balance sheet total over 20 million
•  public interest entities:
- Payment and electronic money institutions 
-  Pension funds which, during two consecutive years, at the closing 
date of each year, have at least 10,000 participants 
-  Investment services and collective investment institutions, which 
has 5,000+ clients or 5,000+ shareholders
• entities who, during two consecutive years, at the closing date of each year,  
have a net turnover over EUR 2 billion, and over 4,000 employees
likewise  
 
additionally: explanation of the sums 
indicated in the financial statement 





EMAS, UNGC, UNGP, 
OECD, ISO 26000, ILO 
Declaration or GRI
within the management report or a separate report 
published alongside the managemnet report, or 
a consolidated management report (provided the 
company scope criteria are exceeded 2 years in a 
row)
yes yes presence of statement
Sweden • over 250 employees 
net turnover over SEK 350 (EUR 35) million or balance sheet total over SEK 175 (EUR 
17 million) 
 
reporting obligation applies to all types of companies that fulfill at least two of the 
criteria regarding turnover, assets or number of employees, and is not limited to PIEs
likewise  
 
additionally an explanation of the sums 
indicated in the financial statement 
which are relevant to corporate social 
responsibility
likewise within the annual report or a separate sustainability 
report published alongside the annual report
yes yes presence of statement
United Kingdom over 500 employees likewise likewise within the strategic report yes yes presence and content of 
statement
*  In all countries except Denmark, the reporting requirement applies to public interest entities, i.e. listed companies, credit institutions and insurance undertakings. The table only contains additional national definitions for 
public interest entities as well as entities that are additionally required to report.   
    additional source:  
CSR Europe and GRI: Member State Implementation of Directive 2014/95/EU - A comprehensive overview of how Member States are implementing the EU Directive on Non-financial and Diversity Information
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INTERVIEW
INE SMITS AND 
GUY VAN GYES
Name  Ine Smits, Guy Van Gyes
Country  Belgium
Organisation HIVA-KU Leuven
What is your personal motivation for working on topics related to non-fi-
nancial reporting?
Non-financial information is a broad concept with three important pillars, 
each of which was incorporated into the current practice of company 
reporting for different reasons.
Looking at the environmental pillar, I think well-developed legislation on 
non-financial information reporting can play a major role in the efforts of 
slowing down climate change. 
Regarding the social pillar, the importance of non-financial information 
reporting by companies is even more crucial. The obligation to report 
information on employee matters can be an incentive for companies to 
ameliorate their human resource strategies, but also, it can raise aware-
ness on the importance of employment quality.
Even though at first sight the pillar related to human rights, anti-corrup-
tion and bribery matters may seem less critical in Western societies, it 
is also crucial. On the one hand, this is because violations in this respect 
should be prevented. On the other hand, and in a more indirect way, this 
could be a way to encourage companies to become acquainted with the 
environmental and employment conditions of their larger network. In a 
global economy, the main idea should be that companies not only report 
on their local company’s state of affairs, but also include their supply 
chain and even partners or investors. 
When did you first start working on topics related to non-financial?
For over 40 years, HIVA has built an extensive knowledge base on em-
ployee matters, including research into job quality and employee partic-
ipation. Research on corporate social responsibility theories, practices 
and instruments, which is critical from the perspective of the employee, 
has been one of the focal points linked to the basic questions: what is or 
can be the added value?
What has changed since then?
Regarding employee matters, we notice an increased interest in the im-
portance of social relations when measuring job quality. This implies that 
there is increasingly more legitimacy for the attention given by research-
ers into job quality to employee representation, among other things. 
Regarding non-financial information in general, this increasing interest 
is observed as well. During the past 15 years, legislation on these topics 
has emerged, gaining more and more societal support.
Of course, this rising interest has to do with the intensifying struggle of 
trade unions and labour movements to exert influence on the social per-
formance of companies using the framework of the existing institutions 
and the increasingly disturbing effect of the financialisation of corporate 
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governance. Moreover, the stakeholder per-
spective has been broadened with new topics 
coming into play, especially those related to 
sustainable development and internationali-
sation / decent work.
What benefits can trade unions in particular 
draw from non-financial information?
The publication of correct non-financial in-
formation can be a very interesting source 
for trade unions to gain clarification on the 
actual state of affairs in companies and sec-
tors. As for their influence at the political and 
policy level, the reports comprise important 
information that could serve as the basis for 
well-defined and solid recommendations and 
demands. The reports can provide informa-
tion on the topics that require more attention 
and can uncover common problems which 
trade unions have previously failed to detect 
using other, traditional means. Also, the re-
sults of the analyses of these reports facili-
tate a comparison of companies and sectors, 
which could promote understanding of the 
labour market and the identification of priori-
ties for policy interests.
For the same reasons, insight into the non-fi-
nancial information reports, can also improve 
the local work done by trade unions within 
companies. First of all, this is because trade 
unions are now better informed, and secondly, 
because the obligation to compile and pres-
ent such a report forces companies to pay 
sufficient attention to these matters, which 
could result in better performance regarding 
environmental and employee matters.
However, the benefits must not be overesti-
mated. It is only an instrument of information 
and as such – a limited power instrument. 
Besides process problems, such as obtaining 
useful and interpretable data from the right 
company level, it is only a first step in estab-
lishing improved governance models within 
a company such as, for example, a shift from 
shareholder to stakeholder governance or 
taking into account the transnational level.
What is the most remarkable difference in 
your country regarding non-financial report-
ing compared to other European countries?
Belgium has a well-defined system of infor-
mation and consultation, which means that 
the Works Council has insight into the finan-
cial and economic information of the compa-
ny. This information strengthens the power of 
trade unions. 
Regarding the reporting on non-financial in-
formation in specific, currently, some of the 
information is included in the annual manage-
ment report, which is made publicly available 
on the company website or by the National 
Bank of Belgium. Evidentially, this publication 
can be of great advantage for the non-finan-
cial information reporting practice. 
What has been the biggest setback for work-
ing on non-financial information?
Before the European directive, no overarch-
ing legislation on non-financial information 
existed, causing the treatment of this topic to 
become very fragmented, with different legis-
lators, responsibilities, requirements and con-
ditions. Since the responsibilities resulting 
from the different topics are spread over mu-
nicipal, regional, federal and more levels, this 
fragmentation will continue to make it difficult 
to further develop this legislative field and to 
take steps forward.
How do you see the future of non-financial 
reporting?
It is crucial to shift the focus of the compa-
nies, which is currently on financial reporting, 
and proceed to the next step, in an attempt to 
develop a legislative framework on non-finan-
cial information. Bearing in mind the increas-
ing attention given to the three main topics 
(environment, personnel and human rights) in 
research as well as in society, it seems that 
the time has come and policy makers are now 
able to enjoy sufficient support, helping them 
to embrace these matters and create a sus-
tainable framework.
What should be the next steps for unions in 
dealing with non-financial reporting?
Since trade unions can have a significant 
influence on policy making so long as they 
agree on compromises with the employer’s 
representative organisations, it is important 
to maintain good relationships with each 
other in order to make full use of this possi-
ble impact. This will facilitate the debate on 
non-financial information reporting and will 
lead to more progressive outcomes.
Regarding the content of non-financial infor-
mation, it is important to keep moving for-
ward and not to become complacent with the 
current state of affairs. In addition, it is the 
task of trade unions to convince companies 
at the local level of the importance and util-
ity of the non-financial information reports. 
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Through their relations with all types of com-
panies in all sectors, trade unions play a sig-
nificant role in the dissemination of reporting 
practice by showing companies how they can 
take this chance to positively influence the 
company traditions and publication.
However, a warning is necessary once again. 
‘Information’ is not ‘participation’ and when 
one wants the interests and influence of 
other stakeholders to increase in corporate 
governance, what is more important are other 
innovative measures than simply those relat-
ed to information disclosure. By letting the 
powerful actors in corporate governance re-
port on what they do, changes are only limited 
regarding who these power actors are and 
what they decide.
What are your political demands for the fur-
ther development of non-financial reporting?
The current directive is a good starting 
point in this rather new legislative field but 
it contains some weak points that should be 
clarified in the coming years, in order for this 
reporting practice to effectively impact the 
labour market. In the first place, the legitima-
cy and impact of non-financial information 
reports can be increased by adding the com-
pany’s supply chain to the scope of the report. 
Also, broadening the target group of the legis-
lation to include state-owned enterprises will 
contribute to the legitimacy of the reporting 
practice. State-owned enterprises have a role 
of setting an example, especially regarding 
the topics of employee matters, environment 
and human rights. 
A second option to further improve the cur-
rent directive is to include regulations on the 
availability of the reports. Making the non-fi-
nancial information reports publicly available 
can increase the actual impact of the reports, 
because the information will be open to the 
public, incentivising companies to effectively 
invest in these topics. However, since the 
aim of these reports is not merely to be used 
by companies as a promotion, high-quality 
audits are a necessity. Without such audits, 
there is a high risk that these reports will be 
treated as simply an extra obligation without 




Name  dr hab. Dagmara Skupień 
Country  Poland
Organisation  Faculty of Law and Adminis-
tration, University of Lodz
What is your personal motivation for working 
on topics related to non-financial reporting?
The scope of my scientific research covers 
especially social dialogue, workers’ involve-
ment in management, and the activities of 
trade unions and works councils. It seems 
quite obvious that non-financial reporting 
falls into my area of interest.
When did you first start working on topics 
related to non-financial reporting?
In 2011, I participated in the preparation of an 
ETUI report on non-financial reporting. 
What has changed since then?
The interest of undertakings in the prepara-
tion of CSR documents has increased. Non-fi-
nancial reporting has experienced stronger 
alignment with international standards and 
the content has become more precise. We 
have yet to see what changes the new man-
datory rules in Poland will bring, which are 
the results of the transposition of Directive 
2014/95/EU.
What benefits can trade unions in particular 
draw from non-financial information?
The consolidation of different non-financial 
information in one single document might 
offer some conclusive insights. This could be 
useful for consultations on topics tackled in 
the CSR documents.
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What is the most remarkable difference in your country  
regarding non-financial reporting compared to other Europe-
an countries?
I am not sure how much of a difference this represents 
in comparison with other countries but companies in 
Poland mostly do consult CSR documents with different 
stakeholders, though not necessarily with trade unions or 
works councils. Social dialogue with ‘internal stakeholders’ 
like trade unions or works councils usually takes place only 
in the groups of companies and individual companies where 
the State Treasury is a majority owner, for example the 
LOTOS Group. Even there, the employee representatives do 
not seem to be involved in the preparation of non-financial 
reports. The trade unions’ confederations in Poland do not 
see non-financial reporting as offering new perspectives for 
their activities.
What has been the biggest setback for working  
on non-financial information?
The relatively little scientific writing in Poland on this 
subject.
How do you see the future of non-financial reporting?
The documents will become more elaborate, more precise 
and prepared in compliance with international standards. 
With this being said, I do not foresee that trade unions or 
other employee representatives will play any serious role 
in their preparation. Non-financial reporting will probably 
remain a unilateral issue for the management bodies of 
companies, serving to improve their social, ethical and 
environmental image. The majority of companies, especially 
those in the private sector, are becoming more inclined 
towards leading dialogue directly with employees.
What should be the next steps for unions in dealing with non-
financial reporting?
Trade unions should carry out evaluation of the importance 
of the transmitted information as well as an analysis of  
a possible need for consultations on different matters 
covered by non-financial reports.
What are your political demands for the further  
development of non-financial reporting?
Non-financial reporting should be developed according  
to stricter rules resulting from international standards.
Also, the approach towards the preparation of CSR 
documents has to become more inclusive and more 
participatory. The consultation of the content of non-
financial reporting with trade unions, or other employee 
representatives, in the companies where trade unions are  
not present, should thus be made obligatory.
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NON-FINANCIAL 
REPORTING AND EMPLOYEE 
REPRESENTATIVES 
– PERCEPTIONS AND 
ATTITUDES
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As part of the detailed country studies, for Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, interviews 
based on structured questionnaires were carried out with trade union representatives at national 
level and workers’ representatives at company level. Though this approach did not constitute a 
representative study, it nevertheless allowed us to draw valuable qualitative conclusions on how 
labour representatives perceived NFIR, what they expected from the Directive and what effects on 
social dialogue they anticipated.
First, the interviews explored the knowledge of and the attitude towards NFIR in general, the pro-
cess of its publication and its means of dissemination. Then, the interviewees were asked to pro-
vide an outlook and assessment of possible changes in the area of industrial relations following 
the new legal obligation to publish NFIR.   
As described in the previous parts of this publication, NFIR requirements have been in place in 
France for nearly 15 years. After more than a decade, the debate still remains almost identical. 
For French trade unions, NFIR was closely related to the question of a new concept of governance, 
which was not just about the issue of diversity in the administrative, management and supervisory 
bodies of the company. Although trade unions were very active in promoting NFIR processes, they 
are still rarely associated in committees inside the companies. Therefore, workers’ representa-
tives were hardly involved in the process of identifying the issues taken into account by compa-
nies in their reports. Trade union organisations were never consulted prior to the drafting of NFIR. 
The management was required to notify the works council of the documents that would be sent to 
shareholders at the annual meeting, on which the works council were allowed to submit an opin-
ion, but apart from that, there were no further possibilities of involvement. At best, some large 
companies presented their NFIR to workers’ representatives only after their publication, though 
the distribution was fairly restricted. 
In the opinion of the majority of the union representatives interviewed, the management utilised 
CSR committees to enhance its capacity to adapt NFIR priorities in a strategic way, sometimes 
with the support of a materiality matrix. Unfortunately, most of the time, companies would make 
only small adaptations without any significant change in their practices of implementing CSR pol-
icies or the organisation of the reporting process. This was the reason why union representatives 
were disappointed and disaffected by NFIR, which they perceived as a communication tool or 
some bureaucratic exercise of compiling indicators without any clarification as to their meaning 
for the company’s actions.
The interviewees stated that some very few pioneer companies had a predilection for dialogue 
with trade unions at the national or sectoral level despite having internal union representatives. 
This was because the top management were looking for expertise, which would not yet exist 
among local union representatives. However, some of the interviewed union representatives who 
had already experimented with the implementation of ISO 26000 by participating in CSR commit-
tees think that perhaps sufficient experience and political will of the top management could lead 
to better recognition of the skills of union representatives regarding NFIR matters. In their view, 
the promotion of long-term, faithful and constructive dialogue and accompanying measures of 
capacity building for union delegates could make this possible. Conversely, the lack of informa-
tion, training and of consultation processes would put a brake on it. As involvement was usually 
minimised, trade unions often regarded discussion of NFIR matters as a luxury in a very difficult 
period of the current crisis.
The interviewed workers’ representatives complained about the great disparity in NFIR, making 
comparisons difficult. This heterogeneity could be explained by the wide margin of interpretation 
allowed for by the legal framework, in particular, by the lack of specific indicators recommended by 
the legislature, as well as by the various motivations behind such publication. The interviewees ex-
pressed that the main motive for the preparation of NFIR was not to contribute to a consultation with 
stakeholders, but rather to meet the expectations of the financial community and rating agencies. 
Only in one company out of four was NFIR actively utilised for social dialogue. The NFIR require-
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ments had not yet given rise to significant involvement of employee representatives, but certainly, 
the overall picture was not uniform. Often, the distribution of NFIR was confined to a small circle of 
people, making it impossible to make use of the reports. Despite the current lack of involvement, 
the four case studies that have been conducted have shown that under certain circumstances NFIR 
could play a key role in enhancing the social dialogue. One interviewee stated that the approach to 
NFIR had to be different across the different sectors. Trade union federations could play an ener-
gising role in this respect, but for this to happen, they would need the desire to drive forward a new 
dynamic. If there is no large-scale effort to raise awareness on the question of NFIR inside the sec-
tors, the impact will remain weak. It was also pointed out that the ways to give trade unions better 
access to company’s NFIR could be explored, for example, by challenging one company with infor-
mation from a competitor’s report. Furthermore, it was noted that, to date, certain trade unions had 
preferred to concentrate on stricter social agreements, while others would favour the idea of social 
negotiations being integrated into the framework of an agreement encompassing NFIR, effectively 
incorporating social and environmental concerns.
Belgium constitutes another country where NFIR was already mandatory prior to the Directive. As 
mentioned earlier in this publication, trade unions and workers’ representatives in Belgium are tradi-
tionally well supported by Belgian law and organised social dialogue is a standard practice. However, 
even though a lot of information was already available in the annual management reports, it was 
not used by trade unions or by any other institutes. The interviewees expected that the new NFIR 
obligations would go rather unnoticed by trade unions and workers’ representatives. This is because 
companies already presented a very extensive and “bulky” NFIR, in which everything was presented 
more positively than it actually was, though at the same time, failing to provide any answers to the 
real critical question they had. It was affirmed that employee representatives were indeed interest-
ed in the reporting and that there was a demand for specific information about employee matters, 
though the existing reports, being part of the company’s marketing strategy, would not provide that 
kind of sensitive information. Nevertheless, the interviewees welcomed the new obligations arising 
from the Directive, as they were hoping for a change now that the new law would require companies 
to provide workers’ representatives with more information, including some additional specific infor-
mation regarding social issues.
However, when asked about the significance of NFIR, the interviewees conceded that CSR matters 
were more likely to play a role in companies with a close cooperation between the management 
and workers’ representatives that had an interest in, e.g., innovation and organisation, whereas 
they were hardly a topic at all in companies where employees were out on strike over their wages or 
working conditions. The interviewees also stated that there had been attempts at the national level 
to formulate demands for negotiations with the management about the form and content of NFIR 
but, unfortunately, employers’ organisations had been very quick to refuse. Consequently, the inter-
viewed trade union representatives doubted that workers’ representatives at company level would 
demand to be involved in the reporting process anytime in the near future.
Asked about their expectations towards the EU legislators, the interviewed trade union represent-
atives stated that a central website, similar to the GRI one, which collects information on all types 
of NFIR, could prove useful. Furthermore, it would be interesting if the EU carried out comparative 
studies between companies and countries, analysing the quality and content of the reports and de-
veloping a scoring system at company and country level. They also agreed that as long as there was 
no binding reporting standard, the differences in quality would persist, making it more difficult to 
monitor and asses the possible impacts.
At company level, since it was obligatory to inform, consult and present the information contained in 
the annual management report, including mandatory NFI, to the works council, the majority of em-
ployee representatives confirmed that in all cases they had the opportunity to read the report, that 
the report had been formally presented to them and that there had been an exchange between the 
management and trade unions regarding the report. Additionally, the quality of the information was 
assessed to be positively related to the size, union strength and “age” of the company.Nevertheless, 
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the situation was different when looking at the preparation of the report, where workers’ represent-
atives were not involved at all. Thus, involvement in the implementation and execution of some ele-
ments of the annual management report or financial report, such as the social balance sheet, did not 
mean that there was actual collaboration with regard to preparing the annual report. The reactions 
of workers’ representatives at company level as to the impact or opportunities of the legal obligation 
varied across the interviewees. As a summary, it can be stated that a majority were unambiguously 
positive about NFIR and the Directive, seeing it as a chance to treat this subject properly. However, 
while all interviewees were able to identify important advantages of this type of report, not everyone 
was convinced that it would have much impact on the topics in social dialogue or industrial rela-
tions, nor would it spur workers’ representatives to formulate more radical demands. Exceptions 
were noted in two companies, in the food and beverage sector and in the financial sector respec-
tively, where the interviewees expected the NFIR obligation not to influence the interests of workers’ 
representatives or the social dialogue at all, because the topics covered were not considered impor-
tant enough.
With regard to companies with a European Works Council in place, the answers of the interviewees 
varied widely, suggesting this would depend on the specific company structure. Also, it became 
clear that it was difficult for workers’ representatives to predict these possible changes and impacts 
on a European level, given the different forms of implementing the Directive in the various member 
states in which they operate.
In Italy, representatives of both trade unions (CISL and CGIL) agreed on the importance of NFIR and 
concurred that trade unions should assume a vital role in its production. NFIR should neither be a 
mere marketing exercise nor should it replace social dialogue, but it was seen as a means that could 
contribute to and complement social dialogue. NFIR was about integrating responsible behaviour 
into the company’s day-to-day operations and activities and it needed to be based on the principle 
of equal dignity of all subjects involved in these business activities. However, this process would 
presuppose that the logic of profit was not a sufficient condition in determining the real value of 
productive activity, but instead, social and environmental sustainability will have to become a funda-
mental parameter of business activity. 
The trade union representatives also saw that NFIR could be used in a misleading manner, with 
the sole aim of giving the company a more attractive facade. For this reason, the responsibility of 
trade unions should be to promote NFIR as an instrument of economic democracy. A substantive 
approach ought to be taken to the obligation to produce and adopt NFIR . NFIR should not be a 
mere marketing tool of the enterprise but it should contribute to improving labour conditions and 
the social responsibility of the enterprise. Trade unions and other stakeholders could gather a huge 
amount of information about the company through NFIR, which was a key factor in the negotiation 
processes. However, in cases where workers’ representatives were not able to have a say on the 
definition of NFIR standards and in NFIR production, it was up to the management to choose what 
information it wanted to share. The interviewees, therefore, advocated for the introduction of con-
trolling measures, such as the creation of some sort of social rating agency or supervisory body at 
national level. They also saw the need for developing and deepening relationships at international 
level in order to define and improve the standards of NFIR production and strengthen the role of 
workers’ representatives in this process. 
Although, on the trade unions’ side, there was an overall positive attitude to the new reporting ob-
ligations, the interviewees also underlined the fact that, in the trade union’s agenda, the matters of 
NFIR were not currently at the top of their priority lists. This could prove to be a critical factor, since 
the shift from voluntary to compulsory reporting would require steady dissemination of NFIR topics 
among workers and their representatives. Therefore, trade unions, especially at national level, would 
need to stimulate the participation of workers’ representatives in NFIR production and evaluation. 
This is particularly because the interviewees agreed that NFIR could provide a crucial source of in-
formation on the company’s workforce and contract types and conditions, which workers’ represent-
atives could utilise in negotiation processes.
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On the other hand, the interviewees noted that the Directive had some weaknesses too, particularly, 
the lack of binding standards, which is something that should be monitored once the first NFIR have 
been published in 2018. Uniformity and comparability had to be guaranteed through the use of rec-
ognised international and national reporting standards, thus trying to limit the use of different re-
porting methodologies by companies. For workers’ representative, comparability would significantly 
increase the value of the information given and enlarge the possibilities to utilise it. Furthermore, 
NFIR obligations should be expanded to information about the supply chain and subcontracting. 
NFIR production should involve workers and their representatives at company level, which was 
not the case in the majority of companies to date. Although the interviewees admitted that it was 
foreseeable that the management would not request that workers’ representatives be involved in 
the process of NFIR production, they recommended a proactive approach by increasing partici-
pation in the overall NFIR process and diffusion. In negotiations with the employer, both workers’ 
representatives and trade unions should develop proposals regarding the standards, content and 
format of NFIR. 
Looking at the company level, the small sample across various business sectors showed differ-
ent, but overall rather low, levels of knowledge about NFIR among Italian workers’ representatives, 
ranging from rudimentary (almost absent) knowledge of NFIR matters to extensive expertise. In all 
cases, NFIR was perceived as a management duty which did not presuppose any formal involvement 
of workers’ representatives. With regard to dissemination activities, only one company organised a 
public presentation of its NFIR and one other produced brochures with a summarised version for its 
clients. Feedback was usually not given, neither from workers’ representatives nor from other stake-
holders. For all interviewees, NFIR therefore constituted quite an abstract document with mere mar-
keting aims. Furthermore, all stated that they had been given no information regarding the Directive 
and the fact that there were new reporting obligations starting from 2017. Consequently, they were 
not able to point out any weaknesses or strengths with regard to NFIR in their companies. 
As a result, they all stressed the need to receive more information about NFIR standards and pro-
duction, and they would welcome the possibility to participate in any training activities regarding 
NFIR matters. Despite the little knowledge, they considered NFIR to be an important tool to improve 
industrial relations at company level. However, at the moment, the participation of workers’ repre-
sentatives in the process of NFIR production was completely non-existent, which was especially due 
to the prevalence of a mere marketing approach towards NFIR. 
In Spain, NFIR had become more important in recent years due to the pressure from some stake-
holders, including trade unions. Nevertheless, the majority of the interviewees stated that even if 
reports were addressed directly to some stakeholders, they were not addressed to trade unions in 
particular. Usually, companies would organise bilateral meetings or roundtables with stakeholders, 
albeit not with a view to obtaining feedback. The communication process was clearly characterised 
as not reciprocal. Only in very few cases, where the company was structured internationally, were 
there examples of exchange with trade unions. At national level, there were cooperative processes 
between trade unions and NGOs for promoting NFIR matters through the Observatory on Corporate 
Social Responsibility and the State Council of Corporate Social Responsibility (CERSE).
Among Spanish trade union confederations, trade unions, workers’ representatives at company level 
and European Works Councils, there was an interest in participating in NFIR matters in order to actu-
alise the business reality that was described in the reports and to develop the relationship and com-
munication between civil society and enterprises for the purpose of general improvement of working 
conditions. NFIR were also seen as a chance to improve the possibilities of union action regarding 
the conditions of work in the company and in the subcontractor chain, as they provided trade unions 
with an opportunity to contrast what companies said in their NFIR with the reality in the workplace. 
With regard to the future use of NFIR, it was pointed out that these reports could strengthen union 
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actions in companies and improve accountability, transparency, corporate reputation and risk man-
agement. If the information given is biased or imprecise, this could help in determining the areas for 
improvement.  
Trade unions, therefore, called for a general and mandatory framework in order to allow them to 
properly exercise the rights granted to them by the Worker’s Statute. The interviewees stressed 
the current difficulty around this issue due to scattered and confusing information, the dilution of 
concepts and processes and the deficits with regard to the identification of stakeholders and the 
determination of the materiality of topics. The interviewees also agreed that a minimum of technical 
knowledge was necessary in order to assess and contrast the information provided in the NFIR.
It was also stated that the demand for more information and participation was more pronounced 
among trade union organisations than workers’ representatives at company level. Only in large 
companies with a greater trade union structure was there a stronger interest in these issues and a 
greater demand for information. In the interviewees’ companies, workers’ representatives belonged 
to the union structure and all had experience in this matter. In most cases, they submitted remarks 
about NFIR to the management.
With regard to the new reporting obligations, the perception of the trade union officials interviewed 
was that there would be no major changes in the quality of the reports. In addition, given the tradi-
tion of publishing sustainability reports in the large Spanish companies, albeit on a voluntary basis, 
the number of companies affected by the Directive would be very limited, now and in the medium 
term. In this context, the general view was that the impact of NFIR on labour relations at the compa-
ny level would be marginal.
The interviewed trade union representatives anticipated that in many companies, workers’ repre-
sentatives would ask to be involved in the design and preparation of NFIR, but it would require a un-
ion effort to support and assist those workers’ representatives that decide to participate. Therefore, 
trade union organisations should be the driving force in promoting NFIR. However, within the union 
movement, there was still some scepticism about NFIR and even opposition to unionised work in 
this field. Except for the two major unions, CCOO and UGT, the rest remained dismissive of the topic.
The interviews with workers’ representatives at company level confirmed the reservations regarding 
NFIR. There was a widespread view that NFIR would provide broad and diverse information, while the 
envisaged quality of this information was mostly assessed as poor. The prevailing opinion was that 
despite NFIR providing information on many matters, the reports did little in the way of accounting 
for the impacts and management practices within the company. Mostly, they were unclear on critical 
matters, particularly in relation to conditions in the supply chain. They lacked self-criticism and fol-
lowed a strategy of corporate beautification. The workers’ representatives interviewed considered 
NFIR to be an opportunity, seeing it as an axis of communication, but they did not think it was going 
to motivate additional demands. Furthermore, they doubted the credibility of the information provid-
ed because of the current instrumentation of these reports by the management. 
Employer representatives, who were interviewed too, confirmed the previous assumptions. NFIR 
was not yet incorporated into social dialogue at any level. Greater involvement of trade union or-
ganisations was found at sectoral level, but much less so at company level, with few demands for 
information and participation. NFIR was seen fundamentally as an axis of communication in which 
the full responsibility for what was published and how it was published rested with the management. 
The interviewees came to the same conclusion that NFIR, at least in the short term, would not ener-
gise social dialogue, since NFIR matters had not yet been incorporated into the labour agenda. The 
traditional areas of negotiation and discussion (e.g., collective bargaining, business reconstruction, 
occupational health) had left no space or interest in addressing corporate responsibility matters in 
depth. In the opinion of employer representatives, NFIR would therefore not have a significant im-
pact on labour relations.
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Representatives of the National Trade Union Confederation and of the Sector Trade Unions in 
Germany, consistently agreed that there was a need for the establishment of a general and com-
pulsory framework for NFIR. Despite making do with the voluntary approach for a long time, in 
general, trade unions had pushed for the adoption of the most inclusive and participatory approach 
in defining NFIR instruments. The interviewees saw potential in NFIR, however, as long as reporting 
remained voluntary, the interviewees did not see a chance to shift the form of the reporting from a 
marketing tool towards an accountability report, which would partially explain the previous “inac-
tivity” on the part of workers’ representatives. Additionally, the interviewees cautiously consented 
that, in the past, trade unions and workers’ representatives had focused more on the negotiations of 
collective agreements rather than NFIR.
According to the interviewed full-time trade unions representatives, the utilisation of NFIR at com-
pany level remained highly deficient for several reasons. There is a perception that the management 
based the information on a “strategy of whitewashing”, as self-criticism with regard to negative 
aspects of corporate policy was virtually non-existent. On critical matters, they would provide rather 
unclear information, especially with regard to conditions in the supply chain or countries where en-
vironmental regulations were hardly in place. The interviewees noted that NFIR were not taken into 
account due to a potential lack of information rights or the opportunities of being informed about 
CSR matters but, most of all, because the reports were perceived as a part of corporate public rela-
tions. It was explained that in terms of employment matters, there were information opportunities 
for workers’ representatives through channels other than NFIR, in particular, through the information 
rights in the Economic Committee and, also, through workers’ representatives on the Supervisory 
Board, minimising the perceived value of NFI reports.
The interviews with trade union representatives presented a much-divided picture with regard to the 
workers’ representatives’ knowledge about NFIR. In some cases, representatives of trade unions 
noted that the workers’ representatives at company level had not yet been made aware of NFIR at 
all or had not expressed any desire to know anything about them. Often in these companies, the 
workers’ representatives were not even aware that there was a CSR department. There was virtually 
no formal involvement of workers’ representatives in the process of preparing NFIR. The preparation 
and publication of the NFIR was seen as a management task and considered a marketing approach. 
On the other hand, these cases were contrasted by other interviews that confirmed constellations in 
which workers’ representatives had actively carried out or accompanied the process of NFIR compi-
lation in their companies.
Despite the deficits mentioned above, the interviews conducted generally presented a positive im-
age of knowledge and perceptions of NFIR among workers’ representatives. The interviewees large-
ly followed the management’s view that the company ought to fulfil more than the legal obligations 
regarding information on environmental aspects. This was especially true for listed companies. It 
was also stated that NFIR served as an internal monitoring instrument. Overall, it was recognised 
by both trade unions representatives and workers’ representatives at company level that the com-
pany managements and boards also faced up to their updated responsibilities. NFIR had therefore 
increasingly become a management task rather than just a matter of the CSR department within the 
company. In the opinion of workers’ representatives, the strategic goal behind NFIR was defending 
the company’s reputation and its enhancement.
The question of the correctness and accuracy of the information provided in NFIR did not feature 
in the interviews. However, as it apparently did not deserve a mention as a problem in an open dis-
cussion, it can be assumed that, in the opinion of the workers’ representatives, there was no reason 
to doubt the truthfulness of the information provided. Notwithstanding this positive assessment of 
NFIR by the interviewees, additional highly critical assessments were made as well. The majority 
criticised the fact that the NFIR were addressed directly to individual stakeholders but not specifi-
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cally to the unions and that companies would typically organise bilateral meetings or roundtables 
with stakeholders, though not in order to collect feedback but rather as a marketing measure. The 
communication process with civil society was reduced to press releases, leaving no chance for a 
mutual process of communication. There were few reported cases of external stakeholders sending 
their comments or communicating their expectations directly to the companies. With regard to trade 
unions, there were exceptions in cases where a union structure (Euro Works Councils) existed at 
international level. 
Against this background, the assessment of NFIR by German workers’ representatives, be it compa-
ny-based or union representatives, came to a similar conclusion: Although the approach to develop 
NFIR as instruments for corporate accountability was predominantly desired and actively demanded, 
they were critical of the fact that NFIR were previously produced on a purely voluntary basis.
Conclusion
Regardless of whether reporting obligations had already been in place for many years or were newly 
introduced by the Directive, the interviewed trade union representatives and workers’ representatives 
at company level all came to the same conclusion: NFIR could do a lot in the way of providing valu-
able information, though not in the current or expected form based on the requirements set out in 
the Directive. In all countries, the interviewees criticised the fact that even though NFIR did contain 
extensive information, they presented hardly any information on the sensitive matters which they 
would be the most interested in. Often, the data provided was unclear, with some crucial information 
omitted, e.g., on subcontracting or the supply chain. All interviewees perceived NFIR as a part of their 
company’s marketing and communication strategy for meeting the expectations of the financial com-
munity and rating agencies, rather than as a true accountability tool. As trade unions and workers’ 
representatives were not recognised as stakeholders and were not involved in the preparation and 
feedback process, the decision as to what information was published and how it was published was 
left solely in the hands of the management. The interviewees agreed that a binding standard would be 
necessary in order to enhance the quality and comparability of NFIR. 
The interviewed trade union representatives admitted that this prevailing view of NFIR as a mere 
marketing tool was one of the reasons for their “inactivity” in this field to date. Some also conceded 
that NFIR matters did not rank the highest on their priority list as they had previously focused more 
on the negotiations of collective agreements than on CSR issues. Partially, these attitudes were found 
among workers’ representatives at company level too. Especially in countries with a traditionally 
strong culture of co-determination and a high degree of information and consultation rights, such as 
Belgium and Germany, the information value of NFIR was not perceived as particularly high, as there 
were other channels for workers’ representatives for obtaining the information they needed. With 
regard to the Directive, the interviewees therefore did not expect any impact on the social dialogue.
The interviews have also shown that there is a greater advocacy for NFIR among trade union rep-
resentatives at national level than among workers’ representatives at company level. The question 
arises regarding the reasons for this gap. Do trade unions need to become more active in the promo-
tion of NFIR at company level in the future? What the French case studies have indicated is that trade 
union’s efforts in the past were seen as insufficient. In addition, it has been noted that there have 
been disagreements among trade unions about the significance of NFIR. While representatives in It-
aly believed that trade unions should assume a vital role in the promotion of NFIR, some trade unions 
in Spain remained dismissive of the topic. However, as one interviewee has pointed out, this could 
prove to be a critical factor, since the shift from voluntary to compulsory reporting will require steady 
diffusion of NFIR topics among workers and their representatives.
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